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ABSTRACT 
SOFTWARE REVERSE ENGINEERING EDUCATION 
by Teodoro Cipresso 
Software Reverse Engineering (SRE) is the practice of analyzing a software 
system, either in whole or in part, to extract design and implementation information. A 
typical SRE scenario would involve a software module that has worked for years and 
carries several rules of a business in its lines of code. Unfortunately the source code of 
the application has been lost; what remains is "native" or "binary" code. Reverse 
engineering skills are also used to detect and neutralize viruses and malware as well as to 
protect intellectual property. It became frighteningly apparent during the Y2K crisis that 
reverse engineering skills were not commonly held amongst programmers. Since that 
time, much research has been undertaken to formalize the types of activities that fall into 
the category of reverse engineering so that these skills can be taught to computer 
programmers and testers. To help address the lack of software reverse engineering 
education, several peer-reviewed articles on software reverse engineering, re-engineering, 
reuse, maintenance, evolution, and security were gathered with the objective of 
developing relevant, practical exercises for instructional purposes. The research revealed 
that SRE is fairly well described and most of the related activities fall into one of two 
categories: software development related and security related. Hands-on reverse 
engineering exercises were developed in the spirit of these two categories with the goal of 
providing a baseline education in reversing both Wintel machine code and Java bytecode. 
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1 Introduction 
From very early on in life we engage in constant investigation of existing things 
to understand how and even why they work. The practice of Software Reverse 
Engineering (SRE) calls upon this investigative nature when one needs to learn how and 
why, often in the absence of adequate documentation, an existing piece of software— 
helpful or malicious—works. The sections that follow cover the most popular uses of 
SRE and, to some degree, the importance of imparting knowledge of them to those who 
write, test, and maintain software. More formally, SRE can be described as the practice 
of analyzing a software system to create abstractions that identify the individual 
components and their dependencies, and, if possible, the overall system architecture [1], 
[2]. Once the components and design of an existing system have been recovered, it 
becomes possible to repair and even enhance them. 
Events in recent history have caused SRE to become a very active area of 
research. In the early nineties, the Y2K problem spurred the need for the development of 
tools that could read large amounts of source or binary code for the 2-digit year 
vulnerability [2]. Shortly after the preparation for the Y2K problem, in the mid to late 
nineties, the adoption of the Internet by businesses and organizations brought about the 
need to understand in-house legacy systems so that the information held within them 
could be made available on the Web [3]. The desire for businesses to expand to the 
Internet for what was promised to be limitless potential for new revenue caused the 
creation of many Business to Consumer (B2C) web sites. 
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Today's technology is unfortunately tomorrow's legacy system. For example, the 
Web 2.0 revolution sees the current crop of web sites as legacy Web applications 
comprised of multiple HTML pages; Web 2.0 envisions sites where a user interacts with a 
single dynamic page—rendering a user experience that is more like traditional desktop 
applications [2]. Porting the current crop of legacy web sites to Web 2.0 will require 
understanding the architecture and design of these legacy sites—again requiring reverse 
engineering skills and tools. 
At first glance, it may seem that the need for SRE can be lessened by simply 
maintaining good documentation for all software that is written. While the presence of 
that ideal would definitely decrease the need; it just has not become a reality. For 
example, even a company that has brought software to market may no longer understand 
it because the original designers and developers may have left, or components of the 
software may have been acquired from a vendor who is no longer in business [1]. 
Going forward, the vision is to include SRE incrementally, as part of the normal 
development, or "forward engineering" of software systems. At regular points during the 
development cycle, code would be reversed to rediscover its design so that the 
documentation can be updated. This would help avoid the typical situation where 
detailed information about a software system such as its architecture, design constraints, 
and trade-offs are found only in the memory of its developer [1]. 
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2 Reverse Engineering in Software Development 
While a great deal of software that has been written is no longer in use, a 
considerable amount has survived for decades and continues to run the global economy. 
The reality of the situation is that 70% of the source code in the entire world is written in 
COBOL [3]. One would be hard-pressed these days to obtain an expert education in 
legacy programming languages like COBOL, PL/I, and FORTRAN. Compounding the 
situation is the fact that a great deal of legacy code is poorly designed and documented 
[3]. [6] states that "COBOL programs are in use globally in governmental and military 
agencies, in commercial enterprises, and on operating systems such as IBM's z/OS®, 
Microsoft's Windows®, and the POSIX families (Unix/Linux etc.). In 1997, the Gartner 
Group reported that 80% of the world's business ran on COBOL with over 200 billion 
lines of code in existence and with an estimated 5 billion lines of new code annually." 
Since it's cost-prohibitive to rip and replace billions of lines of legacy code, the only 
reasonable alternative has been to maintain and evolve the code, often with the help of 
concepts found in software reverse engineering. Fig. 2.1 illustrates a process a software 
engineer might follow when maintaining legacy software systems. Whenever computer 
scientists or software engineers are engaged with evolving an existing system, fifty to 
ninety percent of the work effort is spent on program understanding [3]. Having 
engineers spend such a large amount of their time attempting to understand a system 
before making enhancements is not economically sustainable as a software system 
continues to grow in size and complexity. To help lessen the cost of program 
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Figure 2.1. Development process for maintaining legacy software, 
understanding, [3] advises that "practice with reverse engineering techniques improves 
ability to understand a given system quickly and efficiently." 
Even though several tools already exist to aid software engineers with the 
program understanding process, the tools focus on transferring information about a 
software system's design into the mind of the developer [1]. The expectation is that the 
developer has enough skill to efficiently integrate the information into their own mental 
model of the system's architecture. It's not likely that even the most sophisticated tools 
can replace experience with building mental models of existing software; [4] states 
"commercial reverse engineering tools produce various kinds of output, but software 
engineers usually don't how to interpret and use these pictures and reports." The lack of 
reverse engineering skills in most programmers is a serious risk to the long-term viability 
of any organization that employs information technology. The problem of software 
maintenance cannot be dispelled with some clever technique, [7] argues "re-engineering 
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code to create a system that will not need to be reverse engineered again in the future—is 
presently unattainable." 
According to [5], there are four software development related reverse engineering 
scenarios; the scenarios cover a broad spectrum of activities that include software 
maintenance, reuse, re-engineering, evolution, interoperability, and testing. Fig. 2.2 
summarizes the software development related reverse engineering scenarios. 
Achieving Interoperability lAilh 
Proprietary Software 
verification that Implementation 
Matches Design 
Development Related 
Software 
Reverse Engineering 
Evaluating Software Quality 
and Robustness 
Legacy Software Maintenance, 
Re-engineering and Evolution 
Figure 2.2. Development related software reverse engineering scenarios. 
The following are tasks one might perform in each of the reversing scenarios [5]: 
> Achieving Interoperability with Proprietary Software: Develop applications or 
device drivers that interoperate (use) proprietary libraries in operating systems or 
applications. 
> Verification that Implementation Matches Design: Verify that code produced 
during the forward development process matches the envisioned design by 
reversing the code back into an abstract design. 
> Evaluating Software Quality and Robustness: Ensure the quality of software 
before purchasing it by performing heuristic analysis of the binaries to check for 
certain instruction sequences that appear in poor quality code. 
> Legacy Software Maintenance, Re-engineering, and Evolution: Recover the 
design of legacy software modules when source is not available to make possible 
the maintenance, evolution, and reuse of the modules. 
3 Reverse Engineering in Software Security 
From the perspective of a software company, it is highly desirable that the 
company's products are difficult to pirate and reverse engineer. Making software difficult 
to reverse engineer seems to be in conflict with the idea of being able to recover the 
software's design later on for maintenance and evolution. Therefore, software 
manufacturers usually don't apply anti-reverse engineering transformations to software 
binaries until it is packaged for shipment to customers. Software manufacturers will 
typically only invest time in making software difficult to reverse engineer if there are 
particularly interesting algorithms that make the product stand out from the competition. 
Making software difficult to pirate or reverse engineer is often a moving target 
and requires special skills and understanding on the part of the developer. Software 
developers who are given the opportunity to practice anti-reversing techniques might be 
in a better position to help their employer, or themselves, protect their intellectual 
property. As [3] states, "to defeat a crook you have to think like one." By reverse 
engineering viruses or other malicious software, programmers can learn their inner 
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workings and witness first-hand how vulnerabilities find their way into computer 
programs. Reversing software that has been infected with a virus, is a technique used by 
the developers of anti-virus products to identify and neutralize new viruses or understand 
the behavior of malware. 
Programming languages like Java, which do not require computer programmers to 
manage low-level system details, have become ubiquitous. As a result, computer 
programmers have increasingly lost touch with what happens in a system during 
execution of programs. [3] suggests that programmers can gain a better and deeper 
understanding of software and hardware through learning reverse engineering concepts. 
Hackers and crackers have been quite vocal and active in proving that they possess a 
deeper understanding of low-level system details than their professional counterparts [3]. 
According to [5], there are four software security related reverse engineering 
scenarios. Similar to development related reverse engineering—the scenarios cover a 
broad spectrum of activities: ensuring that software is safe to deploy and use, protecting 
clever algorithms or business processes, preventing pirating of software and digital media 
such as music, movies, and books—and making sure that cryptographic algorithms are 
not vulnerable to attacks. Fig. 3.1 summarizes the software security related reverse 
engineering scenarios. The following are tasks one might perform in each of the 
reversing scenarios [5]: 
> Detecting and Neutralizing Viruses and Malware: Detect, analyze, or neutralize 
(clean) malware, viruses, spyware, and adware. 
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Testing Cryptographic Algorithms for Weaknesses: Test the level of data security 
provided by a given cryptographic algorithm by analyzing it for weaknesses. 
Testing DRM or License Protection (anti-reversing): Protect software and media 
digital-rights through application and testing of anti-reversing techniques. 
Auditing the Security of Program Binaries: Audit a program for security 
vulnerabilities without access to the source code by scanning instruction 
sequences for potential exploits. 
Detecting and Neutralizing Viruses 
and Malware 
Testing Cryptogenic Algorithms 
for Weaknesses 
i 
Security Related 
Software 
Reverse Engineering 
Testing DRM or License Protection 
^nti-re versing) 
Auditing the Security of Program 
Binaries (lAithout source code) 
Figure 3.1. Security related software reverse engineering scenarios. 
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4 Reversing and Patching Wintel Machine Code 
The executable representation of software, otherwise known as machine code, is 
typically the result of translating a program written in a high-level language, using a 
compiler, to an object file, a file which contains platform-specific machine instructions. 
The object file is made executable using linker, a tool which resolves the external 
dependencies that the object file has, such as operating system libraries. In contrast to 
high-level languages, there are low-level languages which are still considered to be high-
level by a computer's CPU because the language syntax is still a textual or mnemonic 
abstraction of the processor's instruction set. For example, assembly language, a 
language that uses helpful mnemonics to represent machine instructions, still must be 
translated to an object file and made executable by a linker. However the translation 
from assembly code to machine code is done by an assembler instead of a compiler— 
reflecting the closeness of the assembly language's syntax to actual machine code. 
The reason why compilers translate programs coded in high-level and low-level 
languages to machine code is three-fold: CPUs only understand machine instructions, 
having a CPU dynamically translate higher-level language statements to machine 
instructions would consume significant, additional CPU time, and (3) a CPU that could 
dynamically translate multiple high-level languages to machine code would be extremely 
complex, expensive, and cumbersome to maintain—imagine having to update the 
firmware in your microprocessor every time a bug is fixed or a feature is added to the 
C++ language! 
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To relieve a high-level language compiler from the difficult task of generating 
machine instructions, some compilers do not generate machine code directly, instead they 
generate code in a low-level language such as assembly [8]. This allows for a separation 
of concerns where the compiler doesn't have to know how to encode and format machine 
instructions for every target platform or processor—it can instead just concentrate on 
generating valid assembly code for an assembler on the target platform. Some compilers, 
such as the C and C++ compilers in the GNU Compiler Collection (GCC), have the 
option to output the intermediate assembly code that the compiler would otherwise feed 
to the assembler—allowing advanced programmers to tweak the code [9]. Therefore the 
C and C++ compilers in GCC are examples of compilers that translate high-level 
language programs to assembly code instead of machine code; they rely on an assembler 
to translate their output into instructions the target processor can understand. [9] outlines 
the compilation process undertaken by GCC compiler to render an executable file is as 
follows: 
> Preprocessing: Expand macros in the high-level language source file. 
> Compilation: Translate the high-level source code to assembly language. 
> Assembly: Translate assembly language to object code (machine code). 
> Linking (Create the final executable): 
> Statically or dynamically link together the object code with the object code 
of the programs and libraries it depends on. 
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> Establish initial relative addresses for the variables, constants, and entry 
points in the object code. 
4.1 Decompilation and Disassembly of Machine Code 
Having an understanding of how high-level language programs become 
executables can be extremely helpful when attempting to reverse engineer machine code. 
Most software tools that assist in reversing executables work by translating the machine 
code back into assembly language. This is possible because there exists a one-to-one 
mapping from each assembly language instruction to a machine instruction [10]. A tool 
that translates machine code back into assembly language is called a disassembler. From 
a reverse engineer's perspective the next obvious step would be to translate assembly 
language back to a high-level language, where it would be much less difficult to read, 
understand, and alter the program. Unfortunately, this is an extremely difficult task for 
any tool because once high-level language source code is compiled down to machine 
code, a great deal of information is lost. For example, one cannot tell by looking at the 
machine code which high-level language (if any) the machine code originated from. 
Perhaps knowing a particular quirk about a compiler might help a reverse engineer 
identify some machine code that it had a hand in creating, but this is not a reliable 
strategy. 
The greatest difficulty in reverse engineering machine code comes from the lack 
of adequate decompilers—tools that can generate equivalent high-level language source 
code from machine code. The paper [5] argues that it should be possible to create good 
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decompilers for binary executables, but recognizes that other experts disagree—raising 
the point that some information is "irretrievably lost during the compilation process." 
Boomerang is a well-known open-source decompiler project that seeks to one day be able 
to decompile machine code to high-level language source code with respectable results 
[11]. For those reverse engineers interested in recovering the source code of a program, 
decompilation may not offer much hope because as [11] states "a general decompiler 
does not attempt to reverse every action of the compiler, rather it transforms the input 
program repeatedly until the result is high level source code. It therefore won't recreate 
the original source file; probably nothing like it." 
To get a sense of the effectiveness of Boomerang as a reversing tool, a simple 
program, HelloWorld.c was compiled and linked using the GNU C++ compiler for 
Microsoft Windows® and then decompiled using Boomerang. The C code generated by 
the Boomerang decompiler when given HelloWorld.exe as input was quite disappointing: 
the generated code looked like a hybrid of C and assembly language, had countless 
syntax errors, and ultimately bore no resemblance to the original program. Table 4.1 
contains the source of HelloWorld.c and some of the code generated by Boomerang. 
Incidentally, the Boomerang decompiler was unable to produce any output when 
HelloWorld.exe, was built using Microsoft's Visual C++ 2008 edition compiler. 
The full length of the C code generated by Boomerang for the HelloWorld.exe 
program contained 180 lines of confusing, nonsensical control structures and function 
calls to undefined methods. It is surprising to see such a poor decompilation result, but as 
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Table 4.1. Result of decompiling HelloWorld.exe using Boomerang. 
HelloWorld.c: 
01 
02 
03 
04 
05 
06 
#include <stdio.h> 
int main(int argc, char *argv[]) 
{ 
printf("Hello Boomerang World\n"); 
return 0; 
Boomerang decompilation of HelloWorld.exe (abbreviated): 
01 
02 
03 
04 
05 
06 
07 
08 
09 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22: 
union { size32[] x83; unsigned int x84; } globallO; 
size32 global3 = -1;// 4 bytes 
// address: 0x401280 
void _start() 
{ 
set__app_type () ; 
procl(); 
} 
// address: 0x401150 
void procl() 
{ 
size32 eax; // r24 
size32 ebp; // r29 
size32 ebx; // r27 
int ecx; // r25 
int edx; // r2 6 
int esp; // r28 
SetUnhandledExceptionFilter(); 
proc5(pc, pc, 0x401000, ebx, ebp, eax, ecx, edx, ebx, 
esp - 4, SUBFLAGS32(esp - 44, 4, esp - 48), esp - 48 == 0, 
(unsigned int) (esp - 44) < 4); 
[11] states: "Machine code decompilation, unlike Java/.NET decompilation, is still a very 
immature technology." To ensure that decompilation was given a fair trial, another 
decompiler was tried on the HelloWorld.exe executable. The Reversing Engineering 
Compiler or REC is both a compiler and a decompiler that claims to be able to produce a 
"C-like" representation of machine code [12]. Unfortunately, the results of the 
decompilation using REC were similar to that of Boomerang. Based on the current state 
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of decompilation technology for machine code, using a decompiler to recover the high-
level language source of an executable doesn't seem feasible; however, because of the 
one-to-one correspondence between machine code and assembly language statements 
[10], we can obtain a low-level language representation. Fortunately there are graphical 
tools available that not only include a disassembler, a tool which generates assembly 
language from machine code, but also allow for debugging and altering the machine code 
during execution. 
4.2 Wintel Machine Code Reversing and Patching Exercise 
Imagine that you have just implemented a C/C++ version of a Windows® 32-bit 
console application called "Password Vault" that helps computer users create and manage 
their passwords in a secure and convenient way. Before releasing a limited trial version 
of the application on your company's Web site, you would like to understand how 
difficult it would be for a reverse engineer to circumvent a limitation in the trial version 
that exists to encourage purchases of the full version; the trial version of the application 
limits the number of password records a user may create to five. 
The C++ version of the Password Vault application (included with this text) was 
developed to provide a non-trivial application for reversing exercises without the myriad 
of legal concerns involved with reverse engineering software owned by others. The 
Password Vault application employs 256-bit AES encryption, using the free 
cryptographic library crypto++ [17], to securely store passwords for multiple users— 
each in separate, encrypted XML files. By default, the Makefile that is used to build the 
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Password Vault application defines a constant named "TRIALVERSION" which causes 
the resulting executable to limit the number of password records a user may create to 
only five, using conditional compilation. This limitation is very similar to limitations 
found in many shareware and trialware applications that are available on the Internet. 
4.3 Recommended Reversing Tool for the Wintel Exercise 
OllyDbg is a shareware interactive machine code debugger and disassembler for 
Microsoft Windows® [13]. The tool has an emphasis on machine code analysis which 
makes it particularly helpful in cases where the source code for the target program is 
unavailable [13]. Fig. 4.1 illustrates the OllyDbg graphical workbench. OllyDbg 
operates as follows: the tool will disassemble a binary executable, generate assembly 
language instructions from machine code instructions, and perform some heuristic 
analysis to identify individual functions (methods) and loops. OllyDbg can open an 
executable directly, or attach to one that is already running. The OllyDbg workbench can 
display several different windows which are made visible by selecting them on the View 
menu bar item. The CPU window, shown in Fig. 4.1, is the default window that is 
displayed when the OllyDbg workbench is started. Table 4.2 lists the panes of the CPU 
window along with their respective capabilities; the contents of the table are adapted 
from the online documentation provided by [13] and experience with the tool. 
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Figure 4.1. The five panes of the OllyDbg graphical workbench. 
Table 4.2. Quick reference for panes in CPU window of OllyDbg. 
Pane Capabilities 
Disassembler > Edit, debug, test, and patch a binary executable using actions 
available on a popup menu. 
> Patch an executable by copying edits to the disassembly back to 
the binary. 
Dump > Display the contents of memory or a file in one of 7 predefined 
formats: byte, text, integer, float, address, disassembly, or PE 
Header. 
> Set memory breakpoints (triggered when a particular memory 
location is read from or written to). 
> Locate references to data in the disassembly (executable code). 
Information > Decode and resolve the arguments of the currently selected 
assembly instruction in the Disassembler pane. 
> Modify the value of register arguments. 
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> View memory locations referenced by each argument in either the 
Disassembler of Dump panes. 
Registers > Decodes and displays the values of the CPU and FPU (Floating-
Point Unit) registers for the currently executing thread. 
> Floating point register decoding can be configured for MMX 
(Intel) or 3DNow! (AMD) multimedia extensions. 
> Modify the value of CPU registers. 
Stack > Display the stack of the currently executing thread. 
> Trace stack frames. In general, stack frames are used to: 
• Restore the state of registers and memory on return from a call 
statement. 
• Allocate storage for the local variables, parameters, and return 
value of the called subroutine. 
• Provide a return address. 
4.4 Animated Solution to the Wintel Reversing Exercise 
Using OllyDbg, one can successfully reverse engineer a non-trivial Windows® 
application like Password Vault, and make permanent changes to the behavior of the 
executable. The purpose of placing a trial limitation in the Password Vault application is 
to provide a concrete objective for reverse engineering the application: disable or relax 
the trial limitation. Of course the goal here is not teach how to avoid paying for software, 
but rather to see oneself in the role of a tester, a tester who is evaluating how difficult it 
would be for reverse engineer to circumvent the trial limitation. This is a fairly relevant 
exercise to go through for any individual or software company that plans to provide trial 
versions of their software for download on the Internet. In later sections, we discuss anti-
reversing techniques, which can significantly increase the difficulty a reverse engineer 
will encounter when reversing an application. 
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For instructional purposes, an animated tutorial that demonstrates the complete 
end-to-end reverse engineering of the C/C++ Password Vault application was created 
using Qarbon Viewlet Builder and can be viewed using Macromedia Flash Player. The 
tutorial begins with the Password Vault application and OllyDbg already installed on a 
Windows® XP machine. Fig. 4.2 contains an example slide from the animated tutorial. 
The animated tutorial, source, and installer for the machine code version of Password 
Vault can be downloaded from the following locations: 
> Wintel Reversing & Patching Animated Solution: 
http://reversingproject.info/repository.php?fileID=4_l_l 
> Password Vault C/C+ + Source code: 
http://reversingproject.info/repository.php?filelD=4_l _2 
> Password Vault C/C++ Windows® installer: 
http://reversingproject.info/repository.php?filelD=4_l_3 
Begin viewing the animated tutorial by extracting 
passwordjvault_cpp _reversing_exercise.zip to a local directory and either running 
password_vault_cpp_reversing_exercise.exe which should launch the standalone version 
of Macromedia Flash Player, or by opening the file 
passwordjvault_cpp_reversing_exercise_yiewlet._swf.html in a Web browser. 
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Figure 4.2. Sample slide from the machine code reversing animated tutorial. 
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5 Reversing and Patching Java Bytecode 
Applications written in Java are generally well-suited to being reverse engineered. 
To understand why, it's important to understand the difference between machine code and 
Java bytecode (Fig. 5.1 illustrates the execution of Java bytecode versus machine code): 
> Machine code: "Machine code or machine language is a system of instructions 
and data executed directly by a computer's central processing unit" [14]. Machine 
code contains the platform-specific machine instructions to execute on the target 
processor. 
> Java bytecode: "Bytecode is the intermediate representation of Java programs just 
as assembler is the intermediate representation of C or C++ programs" [15]. Java 
bytecode contains platform-independent instructions that are translated to 
platform-specific instructions by a Java Virtual Machine. 
In Section 4, an attempt to recover the source of a simple "Hello World" C++ application 
was unsuccessful when executables built using two different compilers were given as 
input to the Boomerang decompiler. Much more positive results can be achieved for Java 
bytecode because of its platform-independent design and high-level representation. On 
Windows®, machine code is typically stored in files with the extensions *.exe, *.dll; the 
file extensions for machine code vary per operating system. This is not the case with 
Java bytecode as it is always stored in files that have a * class extension. Related Java 
classes, such as those for an application or class library, are often bundled together in an 
archive file with a *.jar extension. The Java Language Specification allows at most one 
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top-level public class to be defined per *.java source file and requires that the bytecode 
be stored in a file with whose name matches the pattern TopLevelClassName.class. 
Java 
bytecode 
Machine instruction 
JVM instruction 
Java Virtual 
Machine (JVM) SSHilBH 
Machine 
code 
CPU 
Figure 5.1. Execution of Java bytecode versus machine code. 
5.1 Decompiling and Disassembling Java Bytecode 
To demonstrate how much more feasible it is to recover Java source code from 
Java bytecode than it is to recover C/C++ code from machine code, we decompile the 
bytecode for the program List Arguments.Java using Jad, a Java decompiler which can be 
found here [16]; we then compare the generated Java source with the original. Before 
performing the decompilation we peek at the bytecode usingy'avap to get an idea of how 
much information survives the translation from high-level Java source to the intermediate 
format of Java bytecode. Table 5.1 contains the source code for List Arguments.Java, a 
simple Java program that echoes each argument passed on the command-line to standard 
output. 
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Table 5.1. Source listing for ListArguments.java. 
01 
02 
03 
04 
05 
06 
07 
08 
09 
package info.reversingproject.listarguments; 
public class ListArguments { 
public static void main(String[] arguments){ 
for (int i = 0; i < arguments.length; i++) { 
System.out.println("Argument[" + i + " ] : " + arguments[i]) 
Bytecode is stored in a binary format that is not human-readable and therefore 
must be "disassembled" in order to be read. Recall that the result of disassembling 
machine code is assembly language that can be converted back into machine code using 
an assembler; unfortunately, the same does not hold for disassembling Java bytecode. 
Sun Microsystem's Java Development Toolkit (JDK) comes with javap a command-line 
tool for disassembling Java bytecode; to say that javap "disassembles" bytecode is a bit 
of a misnomer since the output of javap is unstructured text which cannot be converted 
back into bytecode. The output of javap is nonetheless useful as a debugging and 
performance tuning aid since one can see which JVM instructions are generated from 
high-level Java language statements. 
Table 5.2 lists the Java bytecode for the main method of ListArguments class; 
notice that the fully qualified name of each method invoked by the bytecode is preserved. 
It may seem curious that while ListArguments.java contains no references to the class 
java.lang.StringBuilder, there are many references to it in the bytecode; this is because 
the use of the "+" operator to concatenate strings is a convenience offered by the Java 
language that has no direct representation in bytecode. To perform the concatenation, the 
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bytecode creates a new instance of the StringBuilder class and invokes its append method 
for each occurrence of the "+" operator in the original Java source code (there are three). 
A loss of information has indeed occurred, but we'll see that it's still possible to generate 
Java source code equivalent to the original in function, but not in syntax. 
Table 5.2. Java bytecode contained in ListArguments.class. 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
8 
i: 
11 
11 
IE 
2( 
2: 
2i-
2" 
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3: 
3: 
3^  
3f 
31 
4: 
4^  
4' 
5( 
iconst 0 
istore 1 
iload 1 
aload 0 
arraylength 
if icmpge 
getstatic 
.: new #3; 
1: dup 
3: invokespecial 
3: ldc #5; 
): invokevirtual 
1: iload 1 
:: invokevirtual 
7: ldc #8; 
3: invokevirtual 
>: aload 0 
1: iload_l 
:: aaload 
5: invokevirtual 
1: invokevirtual 
L: invokevirtual 
1: iinc 1, 1 
7: goto 2 
): return 
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#2; // java/lang/System.out 
// java/lang/StringBuilder 
#4; // java/lang/StringBuilder.init 
// "Argument[" 
#6; // java/lang/StringBuilder.append 
#7; // java/lang/StringBuilder 
// "] :" 
#6; // java/lang/StringBuilder.append 
#6; // java/lang/StringBuilder.append 
#9; // java/lang/StringBuilder.toString 
#10; // java/io/PrintStream.println 
Table 5.3 lists the result of decompiling ListArguments.class using Jad; while the code is 
different from the original List Arguments.Java program, it is functionally equivalent and 
syntactically correct, which is a much better result than that seen earlier with decompiling 
machine code. 
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Table 5.3. Jad decompilation of ListArguments.class. 
01 
02 
03 
04 
05 
06 
07 
08 
09 
10 
11 
12: } 
package info.reversingproject.listarguments; 
import Java.io.PrintStream; 
public class ListArguments 
{ 
public static void main(String args[]) 
{ 
for (int i = 0; i < args.length; i++) 
System.out.printIn((new StringBuilder()).append("Argument[") 
.append(i) .append("] :") .append(args[i]) .toString ()); 
An advanced programmer who is fluent in the Java Virtual Machine specification 
could use a hex editor or a program to modify Java bytecode directly, but this is similar to 
editing machine code directly, which is error-prone and difficult. In Section 4, which 
covered reversing and patching of machine code, it was determined through discussion 
and an animated tutorial that one should work with disassembly to make changes to a 
binary executable. However, the result of disassembling Java bytecode is a pseudo-
assembly language, a language that cannot be compiled or assembled but serves to 
provide a more abstract, readable representation of the bytecode. Being that directly 
editing bytecode is difficult, and that disassembling bytecode results in pseudo-assembly 
which cannot be compiled, it would seem that losing Java source code is more dire of a 
situation than losing C/C++ source code, but of course this is not the case because, as 
we've seen using Jad, Java bytecode can be successfully decompiled to equivalent Java 
source code. 
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5.2 Java Bytecode Reversing and Patching Exercise 
This section introduces an exercise that is the Java Bytecode equivalent of the 
exercise given in Section 4.2 for Wintel machine code. Imagine that you have just 
implemented a Java version of a console application called "Password Vault" that helps 
computer users create and manage their passwords in a secure and convenient way. 
Before releasing a limited trial version of the application on your company's Web site, 
you would like to understand how difficult it would be for a reverse engineer to 
circumvent a limitation in the trial version that exists to encourage purchases of the full 
version; the trial version of the application limits the number of password records a user 
may create to five. 
The Java version of the Password Vault application (included with this text) was 
developed to provide a non-trivial application for reversing exercises without the myriad 
of legal concerns involved with reverse engineering software owned by others. The Java 
version of the Password Vault application employs 128-bit AES encryption, using Sun's 
Java Cryptography Extensions (JCE), to securely store passwords for multiple users— 
each in separate, encrypted XML files. 
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5.3 Recommended Reversing Tool for the Java Exercise 
If using Jad from the command-line doesn't sound appealing there is a freeware 
graphical tool built upon Jad called FrontEnd Plus that provides a simple workbench for 
decompiling classes and browsing the results [16]; it also has a convenient batch mode 
where multiple Java class files can be decompiled at once. After editing the Java 
generated by Jad, it's necessary to recompile the source back to bytecode in order to 
integrate the changes. The ability to recompile the generated Java is not functional in the 
FrontEnd Plus workbench for some reason, though it's simple enough to do the 
compilation manually. Next we mention an animated tutorial for reversing a Java 
implementation of the Password Vault application, which was introduced in Section 4. 
Fig. 5.2 shows a FrontEnd Plus workbench session containing the decompilation of 
List Arguments, class. 
To demonstrate using the FrontEnd Plus to reverse engineer and patch a Java 
bytecode, a Java version of the Password Vault application was developed; recall that the 
animated tutorial in Section 4 introduced the machine code (C++) version. The Java 
version of the Password Vault application uses 128-bit instead of 256-bit AES encryption 
because Sun Microsystem's standard Java Runtime Environment (JRE) does not provide 
256-bit encryption due to export controls. A trial limitation of five password records per 
users is also implemented in the Java version. Unfortunately, Java does not support 
conditional compilation, so the source code cannot be compiled to omit the trial 
limitation without manually removing it or using a custom build process. 
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Figure 5.2. FrontEnd Plus workbench session for ListArguments.class. 
5.4 Animated Solution to the Java Reversing Exercise 
Using FrontEnd Plus (and Jad), one can successfully reverse engineer a non-
trivial Java application like Password Vault, and make permanent changes to the 
behavior of the bytecode. Again, the purpose of having placed a trial limitation in the 
Password Vault application is to provide an opportunity for one to observe how easy or 
difficult it is for a reverse engineer to disable the limitation. Just like for machine code, 
anti-reversing strategies can be applied to Java bytecode. We cover some basic, effective 
strategies for protecting bytecode from being reverse engineered in a later section. 
For instructional purposes, an animated solution that demonstrates the complete 
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end-to-end reverse engineering of the Java Password Vault application was created using 
Qarbon Viewlet Builder and can be viewed using Macromedia Flash Player. The tutorial 
begins with the Java Password Vault application, FrontEnd Plus, and Sun's Java JDK vl.6 
installed on a Windows XP® machine. Fig. 5.3 contains an example slide from the 
animated tutorial. The animated tutorial, source, and installer for the Java version of 
Password Vault can be downloaded from the following locations: 
> Java Bytecode Reversing & Patching Animated Solution: 
http://reversingproject.info/repository. php?fileID=5_4_l 
> Password Vault Java Source code: 
http://reversingproject.info/repository.php?fileID=5_4_2 
> Password Vault (Java Version) Windows® installer: 
http://reversingproject.info/repository.php?fileID=5_4_3 
Begin viewing the tutorial by extractmgpassword_vaultjava_reversing_exercise.zip to a 
local directory and either running password_vaultjava_reversing_exercise.exe which 
should launch the standalone version of Macromedia Flash Player, or by opening the file 
password_vaultjava_reversing_exercise_viewlet._swf.html in a Web browser. 
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6 Basic Anti-Reversing Techniques 
Having seen that it is fairly straight-forward for a reverse engineer to disable the 
trial limitation on the machine code and Java bytecode implementations of the Password 
Vault application, we now investigate applying anti-reversing techniques to both 
implementations in order to make it significantly more difficult for the trial limitation to 
be disabled. While anti-reversing techniques cannot completely prevent software from 
being reverse engineered, they act as a deterrent by increasing the challenge for the 
reverse engineer. [5] states "It is never possible to entirely prevent reversing" and "What 
is possible is to hinder and obstruct reversers by wearing them out and making the 
process so slow and painful that they give up." The remainder of this section introduces 
basic anti-reversing techniques, two of which are demonstrated in Sections 7 and 8. 
While it is not possible to completely prevent software from being reverse 
engineered, a reasonable goal is to make it as difficult as possible. Implementing anti-
reversing strategies for source code, machine code, and bytecode can have adverse effects 
on a program's size, efficiency, and maintainability; therefore, it's important to evaluate 
whether a particular program warrants the cost of protecting it. The basic anti-reversing 
techniques introduced in this section are meant to be applied post-production, after the 
coding for an application is complete and tested. These techniques obscure data and logic 
and therefore are difficult to implement while also working on the actual functionality of 
the application—doing so could hinder or slow debugging and, even worse, create a 
dependency between the meaningful program logic and the anti-reversing strategies used. 
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[5] describes three basic anti-reversing techniques: 
> Eliminating Symbolic Information: The first and most obvious step in preventing 
reverse engineering of a program is to render unrecognizable, all symbolic 
information in machine code or bytecode because such information can be quite 
useful to a reverse engineer. Symbolic information includes class names, method 
names, variable names, and string constants that are still readable after a program 
has been compiled down to machine code or bytecode. 
> Obfuscating the Program: Obfuscation includes eliminating symbolic 
information, but goes much further. Obfuscation strategies include: modifying the 
layout of a program, introducing confusing non-essential logic or control flow, 
and storing data in difficult to interpret organizations or formats. Applying all of 
these techniques can render a program difficult to reverse, however care must be 
taken to ensure the original functionality of the application remains intact. 
> Embedding Antidebugger Code: Static analysis of machine code is usually carried 
out using a disassembler and heuristic algorithms that attempt to understand the 
structure of the program. Active or live analysis of machine code is done using an 
interactive debugger-disassembler that can attach to a running program and allow 
a reverse engineer to step through each instruction and observe the behavior of the 
program at key points during it's execution. Live analysis is how most reverse 
engineers get the job done, so it's common for developers to want to implement 
guards against binary debuggers. 
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7 Applying Anti-Reversing Techniques to Wintel Machine Code 
Extreme care must be taken when applying anti-re versing techniques because 
some ultimately change the machine code or Java bytecode that will be executed on the 
target processor. In the end, if a program doesn't work, measuring how efficient or 
difficult to reverse engineer it is becomes meaningless [18]. Some of the anti-reversing 
transformations performed on source code to make it more difficult to understand in both 
source and executable formats, can make the source code more challenging for a 
compiler to process because the program no longer looks like something a human would 
write. [18] states "any compiler is going to have at least some pathological programs 
which it will not compile correctly." Compiler failures on so called "pathological" 
programs occur because compiler test cases are most often coded by people—not 
mechanically generated by a tool that knows how to try every fringe case and surface 
every bug. Keeping this in mind, one should not be surprised if some compilers have 
difficulty with obfuscated source code. Following the basic anti-reversing techniques 
introduced in Section 6, we now investigate the technique Eliminating Symbolic 
Information as it applies to Wintel machine code. 
7.1 Eliminating Symbolic Information in Wintel Machine Code 
Eliminating Symbolic Information calls for the removal of any meaningful 
symbolic information in the machine code that is not important to the execution of the 
program, but serves to ease debugging or reuse of it by another program. For example, if 
a program relies on certain function or methods names (as a DLL does) the names of 
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those methods or functions will appear in the .idata (import data) section of the 
Windows® PE header. In production versions of a program, the machine code doesn't 
directly contain any symbolic information from the original source code—such as method 
names, variable names, or line numbers; the executable file only contains the machine 
instructions that were produced by the compiler [9]. This lack of information about the 
connection between the machine instructions and the original source is unacceptable for 
purposes of debugging—this is why most modern compilers, like GCC, include an option 
to generate debugging information into the executable file that allow one to trace a failure 
occurring at a particular machine instruction back to a line in the original source code [9]. 
To show the various kinds of symbolic information that are inserted into machine 
code to enable debugging of an application, the GNU C++ compiler was directed to 
compile the program Calculator.cpp with debugging information but to generate 
assembly language instead of machine code. The source code for Calculator.cpp and the 
generated assembly language equivalent are given in Table 7.1. The GNU compiler 
stores debug information in the symbol tables (.stabs) section of the Windows® PE 
header so that it will be loaded into memory as part of the program image. It should be 
clear from the generated assembly in Table 7.1 that the debugging information inserted 
by GCC is by no means a replacement for the original source code of the program. A 
source-level debugger, like the GNU Project Debugger (GDB), must be able to locate the 
original source code file to make use of the debugging information embedded in the 
executable. Nevertheless, debugging information can give plenty of hints to a reverse 
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engineer, such as the count and type of parameters one must pass to a given method. An 
obvious recommendation to make here, assuming there is an interest in protecting 
machine code from being reverse engineered, is to ensure that source code is not 
compiled for debugging when generating machine code for use by customers. 
Table 7.1. Debugging information inserted into machine code. 
Calculator.cpp: 
01 
02 
03 
04 
05 
06 
07 
08 
09 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
int main(int argc, char *argv[]) 
{ 
string input; int opl, op2; char fnc; long res 
cout << "Enter integer 1: "; 
getline (cin, input); opl = atoi(input.c_str()) 
cout « "Enter integer 2: "; 
getline (cin, input); op2 = atoi(input.c_str()) 
cout « "Enter function [+|-|*]: "; 
getline (cin, input); fnc = input.at (0); 
switch (fnc) 
{ 
case ' + ' : 
res = doAdd(opl, op2); break; 
case '-': 
res = doSub(opl, op2); break; 
case '*': 
res = doMul(opl, op2); break; 
} 
cout « "Result: " << res « endl; 
return 0; 
} 
long doAdd(int opl, int op2) { return opl + op2; } 
long doSub(int opl, int op2) { return opl - op2; } 
long doMul(int opl, int op2) { return opl * op2; } 
Calculators (abbreviated assembly): 
.file "Calculator.cpp" 
.stabs "C:/SRECD/MiscCPPSource/Calculator/",100,0,0,LtextO 
.stabs "Calculator.cpp",100,0,0, LtextO 
.stabs "main:F(0,3)",36,0,12,_main 
.stabs "argc:p (0,3)",160,0,12,8 
.stabs "argv:p(40,35)",160,0,12,12 
01 
02 
03 
04 
05 
06 
06 
07 
08 
09 
10 
main: 
.stabs "Calculator.cpp",132,0,0,Ltext 
call Z5doAddii 
call Z5doSubii 
call Z5doMulii 
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11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
.stabs "_Z5doAddii:F(0,18)",36,0,33, Z5doAddii 
.stabs "opl:p(0,3)",160,0,33,8 
.stabs Mop2:p(0,3)",160,0,33,12 
Z5doAddii: 
movl 12(%ebp), %eax 
addl 8(%ebp), %eax 
.stabs "_Z5doSubii:F(0,18)",36,0,34, Z5doSubii 
.stabs "opl:p(0,3)",160,0,34,8 
.stabs "op2:p(0,3)",160,0,34,12 
Z5doSubii: 
.stabn 68,0,34,LM33- Z5doSubii 
movl 8(%ebp), %eax 
subl %edx, %eax 
.stabs "_Z5doMulii:F(0,18)",3 6,0,35, Z5doMulii 
.stabs "opl:p(0,3)",160,0,35,8 
.stabs "op2:p(0,3)",160,0,35,12 
Z5doMulii: 
.stabn 68,0,35,LM35- Z5doMulii 
movl 8(%ebp), %eax 
imull 12(%ebp), %eax 
The hunt for symbolic information doesn't end with information embedded by 
debuggers, it continues on to include the most prolific author of such helpful information 
—the programmer. Recall that in the animated tutorial on reversing Wintel machine 
code (see Section 4) the key piece of information that led to the solution was the trial 
limitation message found in the .rdata {read-only) section of the executable. One can 
imagine that something as simple as having the Password Vault application load the trial 
limitation message from a file each time time it's needed and immediately clearing it from 
memory would have prevented the placement of a memory breakpoint on the trial 
message, which was an anchor for the entire tutorial. An alternative to moving the trial 
limitation message out of the executable would be to encrypt it so that a search of the 
dump would not turn up any hits; of course encrypted symbolic information would need 
to be decrypted before it is used. Encryption of symbolic information, as was discussed 
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in relation to the Wintel animated tutorial, is an activity related to the obfuscation of a 
program, which we discuss next. 
7.2 Basic Obfuscation of Wintel Machine Code 
Obfuscating the Program calls for performing transformations to the source code 
and/or machine code that would render either extremely difficult to understand but 
functionally equivalent to the original. There are many kinds of transformations one can 
apply with varying levels of effectiveness, and as [5] states "an obfuscation 
transformation will typically have an associated cost (such as): larger code, slower 
execution time, or increased runtime memory consumption (by the machine code)." 
Because of the high-level nature of intermediate languages like Java and .NET bytecode, 
there are free obfuscation tools that can perform fairly robust transformations on 
bytecode so that any attempt to decompile the program will still result in source code that 
compiles, but is near impossible to understand because of the obfuscation techniques that 
are applied. [19] states "Obfuscation (of Java bytecode) is possible for the same reasons 
that decompiling is possible: Java bytecode is standardized and well documented." 
Unfortunately, the situation is very different for machine code because it is not 
standardized; instruction sets, formats, and program image layouts vary depending on the 
target platform architecture. The side-effect of this is that tools to assist with obfuscating 
machine code are much more challenging to implement and expensive to acquire; no free 
tools were found at the time of this writing. One such commercial tool, EXECryptor 
(www.strongbit.com) is an industrial-strength machine code obfuscator that when applied 
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to the machine code for the Password Vault application rendered it extremely difficult to 
understand. The transformations performed by EXECryptor caused such extreme 
differences in the machine code, including having compressed parts of it, that it was not 
possible to line up the differences between the original and obfuscated versions of the 
machine code to show evidence of the obfuscations. Therefore, to demonstrate machine 
code obfuscations in a way that is easy to follow, we'll perform obfuscations at the source 
code level and observe the differences in the assembly language generated by the GNU 
C++ compiler. The key idea here is that the obfuscated program has the same 
functionality as the original, but is more difficult to understand during live or static 
analysis. There are no standards for code obfuscation, but it's relatively important to 
ensure that the obfuscations applied to a program are not easily undone because 
deobfuscation tools can be used to eliminate easily identified obfuscations [5]. 
Table 7.2 contains the source code and disassembly of VerifyPassword.cpp, a 
simple C++ program that contains an insecure password check that is no weaker than the 
implementation of the Password Vault trial limitation check. To find the relevant parts of 
.text and .rdata sections that are related to the password check, the now familiar 
technique of setting a breakpoint on a constant in the .rdata section was used. 
Table 7.2. Listing of VerifyPassword.cpp and disassembly ofVerifyPassword.exe. 
VerifyPassword.cpp: 
0 1 : i n t m a i n ( i n t a r g c , char * a r g v [ ] ) 
02: { 
03: const char *password = "juplter"; 
04: string specified; 
05: cout << "Enter password: "; 
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06 
07 
08 
09 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
getline (cin, specified); 
if (specified.compare(password) == 0) 
{ 
cout << "[OK] Access granted." << endl; 
} else 
{ 
cout << "[Error] Access denied." << endl; 
VerifyPassword.exe disassembly (abbreviated): 
•TEXT SECTION 
# "j up Iter" 
0040144A MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-1C],VerifyPa.00443000 
# "Enter password: " 
00401463 MOV DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+4],VerifyPa.00443008 
# if (specified. compare (password) == 0) 
004014A3 TEST EAX,EAX 
004014A5 JNZ SHORT VerifyPa.004014CD 
# "[OK] Access granted." 
004014A7 MOV DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+4],VerifyPa.00443019 
# "[Error] Access denied." 
004014CD MOV DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+4],VerifyPa.0044302E 
• RDATA SECTION 
00443000 6A75702174657200456E746572207061 jup!ter.Enter pa 
00443010 7373776F72643A20005B4F4B5D204163 ssword: .[OK] Ac 
00443020 63657373206772616E7465642E005B45 cess granted..[E 
00443030 72726F725D204163636573732064656E rror] Access den 
00443040 6965642E000000000000000000000000 ied 
Using the simple program VerifyPassword.cpp, we now investigate applying 
obfuscations to make machine code more difficult to reverse engineer. The first 
obfuscation that will be applied is a data transformation technique which [5] calls 
"Modifying Variable Encoding". Essentially this technique prescribes that all 
meaningful and sensitive constants in a program be stored or represented in an alternate 
encoding, such as ciphertext. For numerics, one can imagine storing or working with a 
function of a number instead of the number itself; for example, instead of testing for a < 
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10, we can obscure the test by checking if 1.2° < 1.210 instead. To make string constants 
unreadable in a dump of the .rdata section we can employ a simple substitution cipher 
whose decryption function would become part of the machine code. A simple 
substitution cipher is an encryption algorithm where each character in the original string 
is replaced by another using a one-to-one mapping [20]. Substitution ciphers are easily 
broken because the algorithm is the secret [21], so while we will use one for ease of 
demonstration, stronger encryption algorithms should be used in real-world scenarios. 
Table 7.3 contains the definition of a simple substitution cipher that shifts each 
character 13 positions to the right in the local 8-bit ASCII or EBCDIC character set. 
Ciphertext is generated or read in printable hexadecimal to allow all members of the 
character set, including control characters, to be used in the mappings. Note: unlike 
ROT13 [22], this cipher is not it's own inverse—meaning that shifting each character an 
additional 13 positions to the right will not perform decryption. 
Table 7.3. Simple substitution cipher used to protect string constants. 
SubstitutionCipher.h: 
class SubstitutionCipher 01 
02 
03 
04 
05 
06 
07 
08 
09 
10 
11 
Full source code: 
public: 
SubstitutionCipher (); 
string encryptToHex(string plainText); 
string decryptFromHex(string cipherText) 
private: 
unsigned char encryptTable[256]; 
unsigned char decryptTable[256]; 
char hexByte[2]; 
http://reversingproject. info/repository. php?fileID=7_2_l 
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Using the substitution cipher given in Table 7.3, we replace each string constant in 
VerifyPassword, cpp with its equivalent ciphertext. Even strings with format modifiers 
such as "%s" and "%d" can be encrypted as these inserts are not interpreted by methods 
such as printf and sprint/until execution time. Table 7.4 contains the source code and 
disassembly for VerifyPasswordObfuscated.exe, where each string constant in the 
program is stored as ciphertext; when the program needs to display a message, the 
ciphertext is passed to the bundled decryption routine. The transformation we've 
manually applied removes the helpful information the string constants provided when 
they were stored in the clear. Given that modern languages have well-documented 
grammars, it should be possible to develop a tool that automatically extracts and replaces 
all string constants with ciphertext that is wrapped by a call to the decryption routine. 
Table 7.4. VerifyPasswordObfuscated.cpp and corresponding disassembly. 
VerifyPasswordObfuscated.cpp: 
01: #include "substitutioncipher.h" 
02: using namespace std; 
03: static const char *password = "77827D2E81727F"; 
04: static const char *enter_password = "527B81727F2D7D6E8080847C 
7F71472D"; 
05: static const char *password_ok = "685C586A2D4E70707280802D747 
F6E7B8172713B"; 
06: static const char *password_bad = "68527F7F7C7F6A2D4E70707280 
802D71727B7672713B"; 
int main(int argc, char *argv[]) 07 
08 
09 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
SubstitutionCipher cipher; 
string specified; 
cout << cipher . decryptFromHex (enter__password) ; 
getline(cin, specified); 
if (specified.compare(cipher.decryptFromHex(password)) == 0) 
{ 
cout << cipher.decryptFromHex(password_ok) << endl; 
} else 
{ 
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cout << cipher.decryptFromHex(password_bad) << endl; 
VerifyPasswordObfuscated.exe disassembly (abbreviated): 
• RDATA SECTION 
00445000 35323742383137323746324437443645 527B81727F2D7D6E 
00445010 38303830383437433746373134373244 8080847C7F71472D 
00445020 00373738323744324538313732374600 .77827D2E81727F. 
00445030 36383543353836413244344537303730 685C586A2D4E7070 
00445040 37323830383032443734374636453742 7280802D747F6E7B 
00445050 38313732373133420000000036383532 8172713B....6852 
00445060 37463746374337463641324434453730 7F7F7C7F6A2D4E70 
00445070 37303732383038303244373137323742 707280802D71727B 
00445080 37363732373133420000000000000000 7672713B 
Once all constants have been stored in an alternate encoding, the next step one 
could take to further protect the VerifyPassword.cpp program would be to obfuscate the 
condition in the code that tests for the correct password. Applying transformations to 
disguise key logic in a program is an activity related to the anti-reversing technique 
Obfuscating the Program. For purposes of demonstration we'll implement some 
obfuscations to the trial limitation check in the C++ version of the Password Vault 
application, which was introduced in Section 4, but first we discuss an additional 
application of the technique Obfuscating the Program that helps protect intellectual 
property when proprietary software is shipped as source code. 
7.3 Protecting Source Code Through Obfuscation 
When delivering a software application to clients, there may exist a requirement 
to ship the source code so that the application binary can be created on the client's 
computer using shop-standard build and audit procedures. If the source code contains 
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intellectual property that is worth protecting, one can perform transformations to the 
source code which make it difficult to read, but have no impact on the machine code that 
would ultimately be generated when the program is compiled. To demonstrate source 
code obfuscation, COBF [23], a free C/C++ source code obfuscator was configured and 
given VerifyPassword.cpp as input; the results of which are displayed in Table 7.5. 
Table 7.5. COBF obfuscation results for VerifyPassword.cpp. 
COBF invocation: 
01 
02 
03 
C:\cobf_l.0 6\src\win32\release\cobf.exe 
@C:\cobf_l.06\src\setup_cpp_tokens.inv -o cobfoutput -b -p C: 
\cobf_l.0 6\etc\pp_eng_msvc.bat VerifyPassword.cpp 
COBF obfuscated source for VerifyPassword.cpp: 
01 
02 
03 
04 
05 
06 
07 
08 
#include"cobf.h" 
Is lp Ik;If lo(lf ln,ld*lj[]){11 Id*lc="\x6a\x75\x70\x21\x74 
\x65\x72";lh la;Ib«"\x4 5\x6e\x7 4\x65\x72\x2 0\x7 0\x61\x7 3\x7 3 
\x7 7\x6f\x7 2\x64""\x3a\x20";li(lq,la) ; lm (la. lg (lc) ==0) {lb«"\x5b 
\x4f\x4b\x5d\x20\x41" "\x63\x63\x65\x7 3\x73\x20\x67\x7 2\x61\x6e 
\x7 4\x65\x64\x2e"«le; } lr {Ib«"\x5b\x4 5\x72\x72\x6f \x72\x5d 
\x2 0\x41\x63\x63\x65\x73\x7 3\x2 0\x64" "\x65\x6e\x6 9\x65 
\x64\x2e"«le; } } 
COBF generated header (cobf.h): 
01 
02 
03 
04 
05 
06 
07 
08 
#define Is using 
#define lp namespace 
#define Ik std 
#define If int 
#define lo main 
#define Id char 
•define 11 const 
#define lh string 
09 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
#define lb cout 
#define li getline 
#define lq cin 
#define lm if 
#define lg compare 
#define le endl 
#define lr else 
COBF replaces all user-defined method and variables in the immediate source file 
with meaningless identifiers. In addition, COBF replaces standard language keywords 
and library calls with meaningless identifiers, however these replacements must be 
undone before compilation; for example, the keyword "if cannot be left as "lm". 
41 
Therefore, COBF generates the cobf.h header file which includes the necessary 
substitutions to make the obfuscated soure compilable. Through this process, all user-
defined method and variable names within the immediate file are lost, rendering the 
source code difficult to understand, even if one performs the substitutions prescribed in 
cobf.h. Since COBF generates obfuscated source as a continuous line, any formatting in 
the source code that served to make it more readable is lost. While the original 
formatting cannot be recovered, a code formatter such as Artistic Style can be used to 
format the code using ANSI formatting schemes so that methods and control structures 
can again be identified via visual inspection. Source code obfuscation is a fairly weak 
form of intellectual property protection, but it does serve a purpose in real-world 
scenarios where a given application needs to be built on the end-user's target computer— 
instead of being pre-built and delivered on installation media. 
7.4 Advanced Obfuscation of Machine Code 
One of the features of an interactive debugger-disassembler like OllyDbg that is 
very helpful to a reverse engineer is the ability to trace the machine instructions that are 
executed when a particular operation or function of a program is tried. In the Password 
Vault application, introduced in Section 4, a reverse engineer could pause the program's 
execution in OllyDbg right before specifying the option to create a new password record. 
To see which instructions are executed when the trial limitation message is displayed, the 
reverser can choose to record a trace of all the instructions that are executed when 
execution is resumed. To make it difficult for a reverse engineer to understand the logic 
42 
of a program through tracing or stepping through instructions, we can employ control 
flow obfuscations, which introduce confusing, randomized, benign logic that serves to 
make live and static analysis (debugging and tracing) difficult. The often randomized 
and recursive nature of effective control flow obfuscations can make traces more difficult 
to understand and interactive debugging sessions less helpful: randomization makes the 
execution of the program appear different each time it's run, while recursion makes 
stepping through code more difficult because of deeply nested procedure calls. 
In [5], three types of control flow transformations are introduced: computation, 
aggregation, and ordering. Computation transformations reduce the readability of 
machine code and, in the case of opaque predicates, can make it difficult for a decompiler 
to generate equivalent high-level language source code. Aggregation transformations 
destroy the high-level language structure of a program. For example, if a programmer 
used the structured programming technique of functional decomposition, inlining the 
code of many functions into a single function in the machine code would make it 
impossible to recover the original program structure. Ordering transformations 
randomize the order of operations in a program to make it more difficult to follow the 
logic of a program during live or static analysis (debugging or tracing). To provide an 
example of how control flow obfuscations can be applied to protect a non-trivial 
program, we'll apply both a computation and ordering control flow obfuscation to the 
trial limitation check in the Password Vault application, and analyze their potential 
effectiveness, by gathering some statistics during execution of the obfuscated code. 
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7.5 Wintel Machine Code Anti-Reversing Exercise 
Apply the anti-reversing techniques Eliminating Symbolic Information and 
Obfuscating the Program, both introduced in Sections 6 and 7, to the C/C++ source code 
of the Password Vault application with the goal of making it more difficult to disable the 
trial limitation. Rebuild the executable binary for the Password Vault application from 
the modified sources using the GNU compiler collection for Windows. Show that the 
Wintel machine code reversing and patching animated solution in Section 4.4 can no 
longer be carried out as demonstrated. 
7.6 Solution to the Wintel Anti-Reversing Exercise 
The solution to the Wintel machine code anti-reversing exercise is given through 
comparisons of the original and obfuscated source code of the Password Vault 
application. As each anti-reversing transformation is applied to the source code, 
important differences and additions are explained through a series of generated diff 
reports and memory dumps. Once the anti-reversing transformations have been applied, 
the impact they have on the machine code and how reversing the Password Vault 
application becomes more difficult is covered; these obfuscations make it difficult to find 
a good starting point and hinder live and static analysis. The obfuscated source code for 
the Password Vault application is located in the password' vault cpp obfuscated 
directory of the archive located at http://reversingproject.info/repository.php? 
fileID=4 1 2. 
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7.6.1 Encryption of String Literals 
To eliminate the obvious starting point of setting an access breakpoint on the trial 
message, all of the messages issued by the application are stored as encrypted 
hexadecimal literals that are decrypted each time they are used—keeping the decrypted 
versions out of memory as much as possible. Table 7.6 gives an example of the needed 
code changes to PasswordVaultConsoleUtil.cpp. 
Table 7.6. Encrypted strings are decrypted each time they are displayed. 
133 case createPasswordRecord: return "Create a Password Record"; 
==> 137 case createPasswordRecord: 
DecryptMessageText("507F72 6E81722D6E2D5D6E80 8 0847C7F712D5F727 07C7F7 
1", textBuffer); 
186 case recordLimitReached: return "Thank you for trying Password 
Vault! You have reached the maximum number of records allowed in this 
trial version."; 
==> 190 case recordLimitReached: 
DecryptMessageText("617 56E7B782D8 67C822D737C7F2D817F86767B742D5D6E8 
080847C7F712D636E827 9812E2D6 67C822D756E83722D7F72 6E707572712D817572 
2D7A6E857 67A82 7A2D7B8 27A6F72 7F2D7C7 32D7F72 707C7F718 02D6E7 97 97C84 72 7 
12D7 67B2D817 57 6 8 02D817F7 6 6E7 92D8 372 7F8 07 67C7B3B", _textBuffer); 
205 void PasswordVaultConsoleUtil::DecryptMessageText(const char 
*_cipherText, string *_plainTextBuffer) 
206 { 
208 string cipherText(_cipherText); 
210 SubstitutionCipher cipher; 
212 _plainTextBuffer->assign(cipher.decryptFromHex(cipherText)); 
214 } 
The net effect of encrypting the literals is shown in Fig. 7.1 where a dump of the .rdata 
section of the Password Vault program image no longer yields the clues it once did. 
Since the literals are no longer readable, one cannot simply locate and set a breakpoint on 
the trial limitation message—as was done in the solution to the Wintel machine code 
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reversing exercise—causing a reverser to choose an alternate strategy. Note that more 
than just the trial limitation message would need to be encrypted otherwise it would look 
quite suspicious in a memory dump alongside other non-encrypted strings! 
30400300 
00401000 
005SC000 
00550000 
00591080 
00592000 
00599000 
0059B000 
00001008 
00156600 
00001000 
00034333 
00301003 
00007003 
00301003 
33802033 
Password 
Password 
Password 
Password 
Password 
Password 
Password 
Password 
.text 
.data 
. i-data 
/4 
.bss 
.idata 
.rsrc 
PE header 
code 
data 
imports 
resources 
I nag 
I nag 
I nag 
R 
R 
R 
Inag R 
I nag 
Inag 
Inag 
Inag 
R 
R 
R 
R 
RUIE 
RUE 
RUIE 
FttUE 
RUIE 
RUIE 
RUE 
RUE 
73 73 
22 7B 
64 20 
50 61 
69 6C 
76 65 
2E 00 
54 68 
79 69 
75 6C 
61 63 
6D 29 
72 64 
68 69 
6E 2E 
77 
2P, 
73 
73 
65 
64 
5B 
61 
6E 
74 
68 
6E 
73 
73 
00 
rtL 
6F>?2 64 
7D122 20 
75163 63 
73:77 6F 
20122 7B 
20:73 75 
57:61 72 
6E;6B 20 
67 20 50 
21 20 59 
65|64 20 
75*6D 62 
20:61 6C 
20:74 72 
4D: 65 73 
1 
* " 
Data 
20 
77 
65 
72 
2P, 
63 
6E 
79 
61 
6F 
74 
65 
6C 
69 
73 
66! 6F 
61,73 
73:73 
64:20 
7D; 22 
63:65 
69! 6E 
6F!75 
73173 
75:20 
68|6S 
72:20 
6FI77 
61.6C 
61-67 
Obruscanon 
72 
20 
66 
76 
20 
73 
67 
20 
77 
68 
20 
6F 
65 
20 
65 
20 
63 
75 
61 
77 
73 
SD 
66 
6F 
61 
6D 
66 
64 
76 
20 
75 
68 
6C 
75 
61 
66 
20 
6F 
72 
73 
61 
6C 
6C 
73 
75 
00 
72 
64 
76i65 
61 78 
20 
20 
65 
4E 
mi 
72 
69 
72 
6F 
38 
37 
32 
38 
37 
38 
35 
32 
37 
32 
38 
37 
33 
42 
37 
37 
32 
37 
32 
37 
37 
38 
37 
37 
36 
37 
38 
37 
35 
35 
65 
6E 
79 
74 
20 
6C 
00 
20 
20 
20 
69 
65 
6E 
73 
74 
30 
43 
46 
30 
31 
30 
44 
44 
36 
46 
33 
32 
42 
37 
38 
46 
44 
31 
44 
32 
31 
35 
41 
46 
45 
36 
31 
46 
41 
42 
72 
67 
2E 
20 
73 
6C 
00 
74 
56 
72 
6D 
63 
20 
69 
20 
38 
37 
38 
32 
32 
37 
36 
38 
37 
32 
37 
38 
00 
34 
32 
32 
35 
32 
36 
32 
32 
37 
36 
37 
37 
37 
37 
38 
37 
37 
20 
65 
00 
66 
61 
79 
00 
72 
61 
65 
75 
6F 
74 
6F 
46 
ssword for user 
"C*>" was change 
d successfuIly.. 
Password vauIt f 
ile "{#}" was sa 
ved successfully 
..CUarn ing3 .... 
Thank you for tr 
y ing Password Va 
u It? Vou have re 
ached the nax inu 
n number- of reco 
rds a I Lowed in t 
h is trial versio 
n..Message Not F 
30138 34 37 43i 37 46 
46:32 44 38 32i38 30 
38:33 37 38 41 32 46 
44 37 30 37 35136 45 
44 38 30 38 32137 30 
33 38 32 37 39 
45:38 30 38 30 
33 36 45 38 32 
39 37 32 32 44 
44:38 34 36 45 
32:37 31 32 44 
30:38 30 37 33 
36:38 36 34 36 
36:41 32 44 00 
44:38 36 37 43 
44:38 31 37 46 
44:36 45 38 30 
37 39 
38 34 
37 39 
32 46 
38 30 
38 30 
38 32 
45 37 
36 31 
38 32 
38 36 
38 30 
44:36 33 36 45|38 32 
36:37 43 38 32132 44 
44:37 46 37 32136 45 
44:38 31 37 3Sj37 32 
36:37 41 38 321 37 41 
46:37 32 37 461 32 44 
32137 30 37 43 37 46 
39i37 39 37 43 
42:32 44 38 31 
46!37 36 36 45 
30!37 36 37 43 
38 34 
37 35 
37 39 
37 42 
32:38 30 38 30 36 45 
43:38 31 32 44! 35 33 
37 
37 
32 
37 
37 
38 
37 
38 
38 
32 
38 
37 
46 
37 
32 
37 
38 
37 
37 
37 
32 
32 
37 
37 
37 
37 
32 
33 
37 
37 
31 !32 
32 37 
44 38 
42:37 
30 37 
36 33 
43|37 
31 32 
38-33 
44:38 
32; 37 
39: 37 
37: 42 
35 36 
4437 
36-37 
34:37 
39, 38 
35 36 
30 37 
44:37 
44: 37 
43 37 
31i 38 
32! 37 
36:38 
44; 38 
42:00 
34-37 
43:38 
44 
46 
34 
34 
32 
42 
46 
44 
37 
30 
30 
39 
37 
45 
33 
42 
43 
31 
45 
35 
41 
42 
33 
30 
31 
30 
33 
00 
32 
32 
37 
32 
36 
37 
38 
00 
37 
37 
38 
36 
37 
38 
36 
37 
37 
37 
37 
32 
38 
37 
36 
38 
32 
32 
32 
32 
37 
00 
32 
37 
33 
44 
45 
32 
30 
00 
31 
33 
41 
45 
38 
36 
37 
42 
43 
34 
46 
45 
33 
32 
45 
32 
44 
44 
44 
44 
32 
00 
44 
42 
8080847C7F712D73 
7C7F2D8280727F2D 
2F88378FI2F2D346E 
802D70756E7B7472 
712D808278707280 
8073827979863B.. 
SD6E8080847C7F71 
2D836E8279812D73 
7679722D2F88378P, 
2F2D846E8B2D806E 
8372712D80827070 
7280807382797986 
3B.68646E7F7B767 
B746R2D.617S6E7B 
782D867C822D737C 
7F2D817F86767B74 
2D5D6E8080847C7F 
712D636E8279812E 
2D667C822D756E83 
722D7F726E707572 
712D817572207P.6E 
857670827R2D7B82 
7B6F727F2D7C732D 
7F72707C7F71802D 
6E79797C8472712D 
767B2D817S76802D 
817F766E792D8372 
7F80767C7B3B 
5R7280806E74722D 
5B7C812D537C827B 
Figure 7.1. Result of obfuscating all string literals in the program. 
46 
7.6.2 Obfuscating the Numeric Representation of the Record Limit 
Having obfuscated the string literals in the program image, we'll assume that a 
reverse engineer will need to select the alternate strategy of pausing the program's 
execution immediately before specifying the input that causes the trial limitation message 
to be displayed. Using this strategy, a reverser can either capture a trace of all the 
machine instructions that are executed when the trial limitation message is displayed, or 
debug the application—stepping through each machine instruction until a sequence that 
seems responsible for enforcing the trial limitation is reached. Recall that in the solution 
to the Wintel machine code reversing exercise, an obvious instruction sequence that 
tested a memory location for a limit of five password records was found. By using an 
alternate but equivalent representation of the record limit we can make the record limit 
test a bit less obvious. The technique we employ here is to use a function of the record 
limit instead of the actual value; for example, instead of testing for a <= 5, where a is the 
record limit, we obscure the limit by testing if 2a <= 25. Table 7.7 gives an example of 
the needed code changes to PasswordVault.cpp. 
Table 7.7. Using a function of the record limit to obfuscate the condition. 
176 void PasswordVault::doCreateNewRecord() 
178 #ifdef TRIALVERSION 
180 // Add limit on record count for reversing exercise 
181 if (passwordStore.getRecords() .size () >= TRIAL_RECORD_LIMIT) 
==> 181 if ((pow(2.0, (double)passwordStore.getRecords().size()) >= 
pow(2.0, 5.0))) 
The effects of the source code changes in Table 7.7 on the machine code are 
shown in Fig. 7.2. A function of the record limit is referenced during execution instead of 
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the limit itself. This type of obfuscation is as strong as the function used to obscure the 
actual condition is to unravel. Keep in mind that a reverse engineer will not have the 
non-obfuscated machine code for reference, so even a very weak function, like the one 
used in this solution, may be effective at wasting some of a reverser's time. The numeric 
function used here is very simple; more complex functions can be devised that would 
further decrease the readability of the machine code. 
7.6.3 Control Flow Obfuscation for the Record Limit Check 
We introduce some non-essential, recursive, and randomized logic to the 
password limit check in PasswordVault.cpp to make it more difficult for a reverser to 
perform static or live analysis. A design for obfuscated control flow logic which 
ultimately implements the trial limitation check is given in Fig. 7.3. Since no standards 
exist for control flow obfuscation, this algorithm was designed by the author using the 
cyclomatic complexity metric defined by McCabe [24] as a general guideline for creating 
a highly-complex control flow graph for the trial limitation check. 
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if (passwordStore.getRecords().size() >= TRIftLRECORDLIMIT) 
084078E0 
884070E7 
00487BE9 
084078F1 
004078F9 
08407180 
80407105 
0040718B 
004071SD 
00407110 
0040711A 
83BD B0FFFFFF 04 
-76 21 
C74424 08 03000008 
C74424 04 00000000 
C70424 36000000 
E8 01B3FFFF 
-E9 BR070000 
8D45 D8 
S90424 
C785 08FFFFFF FFFFFFFF 
E8 3BBCFFFF 
CMP DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-1003,4 
JBE SHORT Password.0040710A 
MOU DWORD PTR SS:CESP+S],3 
MOU DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+4],0 
MOU DWORD PTR SS:CESP],36 
CALL Password.00401406 
JMP Password.004078C4 
LEA EAX,DWORD PTR SS:CEBP-28] 
MOU DWORD PTR SS:[ESP],EAX 
MOU DWORD PTR SS:CEBP-F8],-1 
CALL Password.00402D5H 
if ((pou(2.0, (double)passuordStore. 
getRecoi-ds() .size()) >= pow(2.0, 5.0))) 
Computation 
Obfuscation 
004ti7iea 
00407196 
0M40710C 
0840710E 
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80487115 
804871 ID 
0040712S 
0040712C 
00407136 
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084071SB 
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DAE9 
DFE0 
9E 
• 73 02 
'EB 2B 
C74424 08 03000000 
C74424 04 00000000 
C70424 36000000 
C785 08FFFFFF FFFFFFFF 
E8 CBA2FFFF 
'E9 BA070000 
8D4S D8 
890424 
C78S 08FFFFFF FFFFFFFF 
E8 0EBCFFFF 
FLD QWORD PTR DS:CSSE420] 
FLD QWORD PTR SS:CEBP-108] 
FUCOMPP 
FSTSW BX 
SAHF 
JNB SHORT Password.004071 IS 
JMP SHORT Password.00407140 
MOU DWORD PTR SS: [ ESP+3 ]. 3 
MOU DWORD PTR SS:CESP+4],0 
MOU DWORD PTR SS: C ESP 3, 36 
MOU DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-F8:,-1 
CfiLL Password.00401406 
JMP Password.B04078FA 
LEfi EAX,DWORD PTR SS:CEBP-283 
MOU DWORD PTR SS:tESP],EfiX 
MOU DWORD PTR SS:CEBP-F8],-1 
CfiLL Password.00402D5R 
Live analysis of the computation I 
00407186 
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80487118 
80487111 
80487113 
...DD8S 20E45B00:1 
DD8S F8FEFFFF 
DfiE9 
DFE0 
9E 
-73 02 
-EB 2B 
FLO JWQBD ETR OS: tSSE4203 
FLD QWORD PTR SS:[EBP-1083 
FUCOMPP 
FSTSW RX 
SfiHF 
JNB SHORT Password.004071IS 
JMP SHORT Password.00407140 
DS:C00SEE420D=32.00000000000000 
Stack SS:[0022FBR0]=32.00000000008000 
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,,:mm
:
: 
. DFE0 
. 9E 
.-73 82 
.-EB 2B 
FLD QWORD PTR DS:[SSE4203 
FLD QWORD PTR SS:[EBP-1083 
FUCOMPP 
FSTSW RX 
SRHF 
JNB SHORT Password.004071IS 
JMP SHORT Password.00407140 
The record limit of 5 is 
obscured by the use of the 
value 32.0 (2A5) when the 
operands are loaded and 
the condition is tested. 
ST<1)=32.000000000000080000 
ST=32.000000000000000000 
Figure 7.2. Record limit comperands are represented as exponents with a base of 2. 
The record limit check is abstracted out into the method isRecordLimitReached 
which returns whether or not the record limit is reached after having invoked the method 
isRecordLimitReached_0. The method isRecordLimitReached_0 invokes itself 
recursively a random number of times, growing the call stack by a minimum of 16 and a 
maximum of 64 frames. Each invocation of isRecordLimitReached 0 tests whether the 
record limit has been reached, locally storing the result, before randomly invoking one of 
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the methods isRecordLimitReached_l, isRecordLimitReached_2, or 
isRecordLimitReached_3. When the call stack is unraveled, isRecordLimitReached J) 
finally returns whether or not the record limit is reached in the method 
isRecordLimitReached. Table 7.8 shows the required code changes to implement the 
control flow obfuscation. Note that a sum of random numbers returned from methods 
isRecordLimitReached_1, isRecordLimitReachedJ2, and isRecordLimitReached'_3 is 
stored in randCallSum, a private attribute of the class; this is to protect against a compiler 
optimizer discarding the calls because they would otherwise have no effect on the state of 
any variables in the program. 
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Figure 7.3. Obfuscated control flow logic for testing the password record limit. 
Table 7.8. Implementation of the control flow obfuscation in Fig. 7.3. 
PasswordVault.cpp: 
if (passwordStore.getRecords() .size () >= TRIAL_RECORD_LIMIT) 
===> if (isRecordLimitReached()) 
01 
02 
03 
04 
05 
06 
bool PasswordVault::isRecordLimitReached() 
{ 
srand(time(NULL)); 
controlFlowAltRemain = max (4, abs(randO) % 64) 
return isRecordLimitReached 0(); 
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bool PasswordVault::isRecordLimitReached_0() 
{ 
while (controlFlowAltRemain > 0) 
{ 
controlFlowAltRemain--; 
isRecordLimitReached 0() ; 
bool reached = (pow(2.0, 
(double)passwordStore.getRecords().size()) >= pow(2.0, 5.0)); 
17: 
randCallSum = 0; 
switch (abs(randO) % 3) 
{ 
case 0: 
randCallSum += isRecordLimitReached_l() ; 
break; 
case 1: 
randCallSum += isRecordLimitReached_2() ; 
break; 
case 2: 
randCallSum += isRecordLimitReached_3() ; 
break; 
return reached; 
unsigned int PasswordVault::isRecordLimitReached_l() 
return abs(rand()); 
unsigned int PasswordVault::isRecordLimitReached_2() 
return abs(rand()); 
unsigned int PasswordVault::isRecordLimitReached_3() 
return abs(rand()); 
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7.6.4 Analysis of the Control Flow Obfuscation Using Run Traces 
The goal of this analysis is to demonstrate that even though the Password Vault 
application is given identical input and delivers identical output on subsequent runs, 
OllyDbg run traces, which contain the executed sequence of assembly instructions, will 
be significantly different from each other—making it difficult for a reverser to understand 
the trial limitation check through live or static analysis of the disassembly. Live analysis 
is hampered more by randomization than static analysis is because the control flow of the 
trial limitation check is randomized each time it is run; one can imagine the confusion 
that would arise if breakpoints are not always triggered, or triggered in an unpredictable 
order. 
OllyDbg run traces are captured using the run trace view once the execution of a 
program has been paused at the desired starting point. To have the trace logged to a file 
in addition to the view, select "log to file" on the context menu of the run trace view. 
Begin the trace by selecting "Trace into" on the "Debug" menu; the program will 
execute, but much more slowly than normal since each instruction must be inspected and 
added to the run trace view and optional log file. An OllyDbg trace will include all the 
instructions executed by the program and its operating system dependencies; fortunately 
the trace is columnar with each instruction qualified by the name of the module that 
executed it, so it is possible to post process the trace and extract only those instructions 
executed by a particular module of interest. For example, in the case of the Password 
Vault traces which we will analyze in this section, the Sed (stream-editor) utility was used 
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to filter the run traces—leaving only instructions executed by the "Password" module. 
To analyze the effectiveness of the ordering (control flow) obfuscation, statistics 
on the differences between three different run traces were gathered using a modification 
of Levenshtein Distance (LD), a generalization of Hamming Distance, to compute the 
edit-distance—the number of assembly instruction insertions, deletions, or substitutions 
needed to transform one trace into the other; we've modified LD to consider each 
instruction instead of each character in the run traces. Fig. 7.4 illustrates the significant 
differences that exist between the traces at the point of the obfuscated trial limitation 
check. The randomized control-flow obfuscation causes significant differences in 
subsequent executions of the trial limitation check—hopefully creating enough of a 
deterrent for a reverse engineer by hampering live and static analysis efforts. Table 7.9 
contains the statistical data that was gathered for the analysis. 
A C++ implementation of Levenshtein Distance, written for this solution, can be 
downloaded from http://reversingproject.info/repository.php?fileID=7_6_l. Note that 
computing the edit-distance between two large files of any type can take many hours a 
modern PC. For reference, the average size of three traces analyzed in this section is 
10MB, and to compute the edit-distance between two of them required an average of-20 
hours of CPU time on an Intel Pentium 1.6GHz Dual-core processor. The LD 
implementation employed in this analysis uses a dynamic-programming approach that 
requires O(m) space; note that some reference implementations of LD require O(mn) 
space since they use a(m+ l ) x ( n + 1) matrix which is impractical for large files [25]. 
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The ~20 hour execution time for the LD implementation is mainly because the dynamic 
programming algorithm is quite naive; perhaps an approximation algorithm would 
perform significantly better. 
Analysis of Run Trace Levenshtein Edit Distances 
Code path: obfuscated thai limitation check 
•*• Edit Distance 
Trace # 2 - T r a c e # 3 
Trace #1 — Trace #2 Trace #1 — Trace #3 
Figure 7.4. Edit-distances between three run traces of the trial limitation check. 
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Table 7.9. Statistical data gathered for randomized control-flow obfuscation. 
Trace Comparison Edit Distance 
Trace #1 -> Trace #2 101414 
Trace #2 -» Trace #3 67590 
Trace #1 -> Trace #3 168892 
Mean Edit Distance 112632 
Trace Comparison Standard Deviation 
Trace #1 -*• Trace #2 7932.32 
Trace #2 -»• Trace #3 31849.5 
Trace #1 - • Trace #3 39781.83 
8 Applying Anti-Reversing Techniques to Java Bytecode 
It was demonstrated in the Java reversing and patching exercise of Section 5.2 
that decompilation of Java bytecode to Java source code is possible with quite good 
results. While it is most often the case that we cannot recover the original Java source 
code from the bytecode, the results will be functionally equivalent. When new features 
are added to the Java language they won't always introduce new bytecode instructions; 
for example, support for generics is implemented by carrying additional information in 
the constants pool of the bytecode that describes the type of object a collection should 
contain; this information can then be used at execution time by the JVM to validate the 
type of each object in the collection. The strategy of having newer Java language 
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constructs result in compatible bytecode with optionally-utilized metadata provides the 
benefit of allowing legacy Java bytecode to run on newer JVMs, however if a decompiler 
doesn't know to look for the metadata, some information is lost; for example, the fact that 
a program used generics would not be recovered and all collections would be of type 
Object (with cast statements of course). 
Recall that in Section 4.1 the Boomerang decompiler failed to decompile the 
machine code for a simple C/C++ "Hello World" program, however in Section 5.1, the 
Jad decompiler produced correct Java source code for a slightly larger program. Given 
these results, one does need to be concerned with with protecting Java bytecode from 
decompilation if there is significant intellectual property in the program. The techniques 
used to protect machine code in the anti-reversing exercise solution, detailed in section 
7.6, can also be applied to Java source code to produce bytecode that is obfuscated. 
Since Java bytecode is standardized and well-documented there are many free Java 
obfuscation tools available on the Internet such as SandMark [27], ProGuard [29], and 
RetroGuard [28] which perform transformations directly on the Java bytecode instead of 
on the Java source code itself. Obfuscating bytecode is inherently easier than obfuscating 
source code because bytecode has a significantly more strict and organized representation 
than source code—making it much more easy to parse. For example, instead of parsing 
through Java source code looking for string constants to encrypt (protect), one can easily 
look in the constant pool section of the bytecode. The constant pool section of a Java 
Class File, unlike the .rdata section of Wintel machine code, contains a well-documented 
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table data structure that makes available the name and length of each constant; on the 
other hand, the .rdata section of Wintel machine code simply contains all the constants in 
the program in a contiguous, unstructured bytestream. The variable names, method 
names, and string literals, in the constant pool section of Java bytecode provide a wealth 
of information to a reverse engineer regarding the structure and operation of the bytecode 
and hence should be obfuscated to protect the software. Therefore, we now look at 
applying the technique Eliminating Symbolic Information in the context of Java bytecode. 
8.1 Eliminating Symbolic Information in Java Bytecode 
Variable, class, and method names, are all left intact when compiling Java source 
code to Java bytecode. This is a stark difference from machine code where variable and 
method names are not preserved. Sun Microsystem's Java compiler javac provides an 
option to leave out debugging information in Java bytecode: specifying javac -g:none will 
exclude information on line numbers, the source file name, and local variables. This 
option offers little to no help in fending off a reverse engineer since none of the variable 
names, methods names, or string literals are obfuscated. According to the documentation 
for Zelix Klassmaster [26], a Java bytecode obfuscation tool, a high-level of protection 
can be achieved for Java bytecode by applying three transformations: (1) Name 
Obfuscation, (2) String Encryption, and (3) Flow Obfuscation. Unfortunately, at the time 
of this writing, no free-of-charge software tool was found on the Internet that can perform 
all three of these transformations to Java bytecode. A couple of tools, namely ProGuard 
[29] and RetroGuard [28] are capable of applying transformation (1), and SandMark [27], 
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a Java bytecode watermarking and obfuscation research tool, is capable of applying 
transformation (2), although not easily. Experimentation with SandMark V3.4 was not 
promising since its "String Encoder" obfuscation function only worked on a trivial Java 
program; it failed when given more substantial input such as some of the classes that 
implement the Java version of the Password Vault application. It's clear from a survey of 
existing Java bytecode obfuscators that a full-function, robust, open-source bytecode 
obfuscator is sorely needed. Zelix Klassmaster, a commercial product capable of all the 
three transformations mentioned above, is said to be the best overall choice of Java 
bytecode obfsucator in [19]. A 30-day evaluation version of Zelix Klassmaster can be 
downloaded from the company's web site. 
Of course one can always make small-scale modifications to Java bytecode with a 
bytecode editor such as CafeBabe [30]. Incidentally, CafeBabe gets its catchy name from 
the fact that the hexadecimal value OxCAFEBABE comprises the first four bytes of every 
Java class file; this value is known as the "magic number" which identifies every valid 
Java class file. To demonstrate applying transformations to Java bytecode, we'll target 
the bytecode for program CheckLimitation.java whose source code is given in Table 8.1. 
For this demonstration, assume that a reverse engineer is interested in eliminating the 
limit on the number of passwords and that we are interested in protecting the software. 
Begin obfuscating CheckLimtiation.java by applying transformation (1) Name 
Obfuscation: rename all variables and methods in the bytecode so they no longer provide 
hints to a reverser when the bytecode is decompiled or edited. Using ProGuard, 
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Table 8.1. Unobfuscated source listing of CheckLimitation.java. 
01 
02 
03 
04 
05 
06 
07 
08 
09 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
public class CheckLimitation { 
private static int MAX_PASSWORDS = 5; 
private ArrayList<String> passwords; 
public CheckLimitation() 
{ 
passwords = new ArrayList<String>(); 
public boolean addPassword(String password) 
{ 
if (passwords.size() >= MAX_PASSWORDS) 
{ 
System.out.println("[Error] The maximum number of passwords 
has been exceeded!"); 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
return false; 
else 
passwords.add(password) ; 
System.out.println("[Info] password (" + password + ") 
added successfully."); 
20: 
21: 
22: 
23: 
public static void main(String[] arguments) 24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
return true; 
} 
} 
CheckLimitation store = new CheckLimitation(); 
boolean loop = true; 
for (int i = 0; i < arguments.length && loop; i++) 
if (!store.addPassword(arguments[i])) loop = false; 
obfuscate the bytecode and then decompile it using Jad to observe the effectiveness of the 
obfuscation; the result of decompiling the obfuscated bytecode using Jad is given Table 
8.2. As expected, all user-defined variable and method names have been changed to 
meaningless ones; of course the names of Java standard library methods must be left as-
is. ProGuard seems to use a different obfuscation scheme for local variables within a 
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Table 8.2. Jad decompilation of ProGuard obfuscated bytecode. 
01 
02 
03 
04 
05 
06 
07 
08 
09 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
public class CheckLimitation 
private static int a = 5; 
private ArrayList b; 
public CheckLimitation () 
{ 
b = new ArrayList(); 
public boolean a(String s) 
{ 
if (b.size () >= a) 
System.out.println("[Error] The maximum number of passwords 
has been exceeded!"); 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
return false; 
else 
b.add(s); 
System.out.println((new StringBuilder()).append("[Info] 
password(") .append(s) .append(") added successfully.") .toString ()); 
21: 
22: 
23: 
24: 
public static void main(String args[]) 25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
return true; 
} 
} 
CheckLimitation checklimitation = new CheckLimitation(); 
boolean flag = true; 
for (int i = 0; i < args.length && flag; i++) 
if(!checklimitation.a(args[i])) flag = false; 
method; it's not clear why the variable "loop" in the main method has been changed to 
"flag" since it's still a very descriptive name. 
Next we further obfuscate the bytecode by applying transformation (2) String 
Encryption, and we do so by employing the "String Encoder" obfuscation in SandMark to 
protect the string literals in the program from being understood by a reverser. The "String 
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Encoder" function in SandMark implements an encryption strategy for literals in the 
bytecode that is similar to the one which was demonstrated at the source code level in the 
Wintel machine code anti-reversing background section: each string literal is stored in a 
weakly encrypted form and decrypted on-demand by a bundled decryption function. 
Table 8.3 contains the Jad decompilation result for the CheckLimitation.java bytecode 
that was first obfuscated using ProGuard and subsequently obfuscated using the "String 
Encoder" functionality in SandMark. 
Table 8.3. Jad decompilation of SandMark (and ProGuard) obfuscated bytecode. 
public class CheckLimitation { 
private static int a = 5; 
private ArrayList b; 
public CheckLimitation() 
{ 
b = new ArrayList(); 
} 
public boolean a(String argO) 
{ 
if(b.size() >= a) 
01 
02: 
03: 
04 
05: 
06: 
07: 
08: 
09: 
10: 
11: 
12: 
13: 
14: 
15: 
System.out.println(Obfuscator.DecodeString("\253\315\253\315\uFF9E\u2A3 
Du5D69\u2AA5\u3884\u91CF\u5341\u5604\uDF5B\uA902\uB6C8\u0C8E\u67 61\ulF3 
5\u35 9D\uBD96\uADA4\u94 6F\u8 5EE\uE8A0\u9274\u58 67\u2C9F\u3 07 7\u5E67\u2A 
0B\u90D2\uB83 9\u58FC\uBE95\u0EBA\uDDF4\u313C\uB7 51\uFA9D\ul6 6C\u42A3\u6 
DlD\uB25A\uA15E\u02 6E\u6ECE\u908C\u557B\u6ABD\uC5D5\u80 0C\uD38A\u3D97\u 
FB5E\uC4C2\uBBAC\u9ADC\u253E\u769E\u4D32\u4FB3\u0CC7")); 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
return false; 
else 
b.add(argO); 
System.out.println((new 
StringBuilder()).append(Obfuscator.DecodeString("\253\315\253\315\uFF9E 
\u2A31\u5D7 5\u2ABl\u3 884\u91E0\u533C\u5 654\uDF6E\uA919\uB6DE\u0CD9\u67 6 
3\ulF26\u3581\uBDDF\uADEl")).append(argO).append(Obfuscator.DecodeStrin 
g("\253\315\253\315\uFFEC\u2A58\u5D7A\u2AB3\u388F\u91D8\u5378\u5604\uDF 
7C\uA91F\uB6CE\u0CCD\u67 69\ulF27\u35 96\uBD9 9\uADBC\u947 6\u85EF\uE8F9\u9 
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234") ) .toStringO ) ; 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
return true; 
public static void main(String arg0[]) 
CheckLimitation checklimitation = new CheckLimitation() 
boolean flag = true; 
for(int i = 0; i < argO.length && flag; i++) 
if(!checklimitation.a(argO[i])) flag = false; 
Note that each string literal is decrypted using the Obfuscator class which was generated 
by SandMark. Since Obfuscator is a public class, it must be generated into a separate file 
named Obfuscator.class—making it very straight-forward for a reverser to isolate, 
decompile, and learn the encryption algorithm. The danger of giving away the code for 
the string decryption algorithm is that it could then be used to programmatically update 
the constants pool section of the bytecode to contain the plaintext versions of each string 
literal, essentially undoing the obfuscation. Ideally, we would like to prevent a reverser 
from being able to successfully decompile the obfuscated bytecode; this can be 
accomplished through control flow obfuscations which we explore next. 
8.2 Preventing Decompilation of Java Bytecode 
One of the most popular, and fragile, techniques for preventing decompilation 
involves the use of opaque predicates which introduce false ambiguities into the control 
flow of a program—tricking a decompiler into traversing garbage bytes that are 
masquerading as the logic contained in an else clause. Opaque predicates are false 
branches, branches that appear to be conditional but are really not [5]. For example, the 
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conditions "if ( 1 == 1 )" and "if ( 1 == 2 )" implement opaque predicates because the 
first always evaluates to true, and the second always to false. The essential element in 
preventing decompilation with opaque predicates is to insert invalid instructions in the 
else branch of an always-true predicate (or the if-body of an always false predicate). 
Since the invalid instructions will never be reached during normal operation of the 
program there is no impact on the program's operation. The obfuscation only interferes 
with decompilation, where a naive decompiler will evaluate both "possibilities" of the 
opaque predicate and fail on attempting to decompile the invalid, unreachable 
instructions. Fig. 8.1 illustrates how opaque predicates would be used to protect bytecode 
from decompilation. Unfortunately, this technique, often used in protecting machine 
code from disassembly, cannot be used with Java bytecode because of the presence of the 
Java Bytecode Verifier in the JVM. Before executing bytecode, the JVM performs the 
following checks using single-pass static analysis to ensure that the bytecode has not 
been tampered with; to understand why this is beneficial, imagine bytecode being 
executed as it's received over a network connection. [31] documents the following 
checks made by the Java Bytecode Verifier: 
> Type correctness: arguments of an instruction, whether on the stack or in registers, 
should always be of the type expected by the instruction. 
> No stack overflow or underflow: instructions which remove items from the stack 
should never do so when the stack is empty (or does not contain at least the 
number of arguments that the instruction will pop off the stack). Likewise, 
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instructions should not attempt to put items on top of the stack when the stack is 
full (as calculated and declared for each method by the compiler). 
> Register initialization: Within a single method any use of a register must come 
after the initialization of that register (within the method). That is, there should be 
at least one store operation to that register before a load operation on that register. 
>• Object initialization: Creation of object instances must always be followed by a 
call to one of the possible initialization methods for that object (these are the 
constructors) before it can be used. 
> Access control: Method calls, field accesses, and class references must always 
adhere to the Java visibility policies for that method, field, or reference. These 
policies are encoded in the modifiers (private, protected, public, etc.). 
Opaque Predicate Template 
doWorkO; 
Figure 8.1. Usage of opaque predicates to prevent decompilation. 
Based on the high-level of bytecode integrity expected by the JVM, introducing 
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garbage or illegal instructions into bytecode is not feasible. However, this technique does 
remain viable for machine code, though there is some evidence that good disassemblers, 
such as IDA Pro, do check for rudimentary opaque predicates [5]. The authors of 
SandMark claim that the sole presence of opaque predicates in Java bytecode, without 
garbage bytes of course, can make decompilation more difficult. Therefore, SandMark 
implements several different algorithms for sprinkling opaque predicates throughout 
bytecode. For example, SandMark includes an experimental "irreducibility" obfuscation 
function which is briefly documented as "insert jumps into a method via opaque 
predicates so that the control flow graph is irreducible. This inhibits decompilation." 
Unfortunately this was not the case with the program DateTime.java shown in Table 8.4 
as Jad was still able to decompile DateTime.class without any problems despite the 
changes made by SandMark's "irreducibility" obfuscation. The bytes of the unobfuscated 
and obfuscated class files were compared to verify that SandMark did make significant 
changes; perhaps SandMark does work for special cases, so more investigation is likely 
warranted. In any event, opaque predicates seem to be far more effective when inserted 
into machine code because of the absence of any type of verifier that validates all 
machine instructions in a native binary before allowing it to execute. 
SandMark's approach of using control flow obfuscations that leverage opaque 
predicates in an attempt to the confuse decompilers is not unique because Zelix 
Klassmaster, a commercial product, implements this approach as well. When Zelix 
Klassmaster V5.2.3a was given DateTime.class as input with both "aggressive" control 
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Table 8.4. Listing of DateTime.java 
Listing of DateTime.java (abbreviated): 
public static void main(String arguments[]) 01 
02 
03 
04 
05 
06 
07 
08 
09 
new DisplayDateTime().doDisplayDateTime(); 
public void doDisplayDateTime() 
Date date = new Date(); 
System.out.println(String.format(DATE_TIME_MASK, 
date.toString())); 
10: } 
flow and "String Encryption" selected, some interesting results were observed in the 
corresponding Jad decompilation. Table 8.5 lists the Jad decompilation of Zelix's attempt 
at obfuscating DateTime. class. Zelix performed the same kind of name obfuscation seen 
with ProGuard, except it went a little too far and renamed the main method; this was 
corrected by manually adding an exception for methods named "main" in the tool. The 
results of the decompilation show that Zelix's control flow obfuscation and use of opaque 
predicates is somewhat effective for this particular example because even though Jad was 
able to decompile most of the logic in DateTime.class; Zelix's obfuscation caused Jad to 
lose the value of the constant DATE TIME MASK when using it on line 12, and 
generate a large block of static, invalid code starting at line 22. In the next two sections 
(8.3 and 8.4), a Java anti-reversing exercise with a complete animated solution is 
provided. In the solution, decompilation of Java bytecode is prevented through the use of 
a class encryption obfuscation implemented by SandMark. Issues regarding the use of 
this obfuscation technique are discussed in the animated solution. 
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Table 8.5. Jad decompilation of DateTime.class obfuscated by Zelix Klassmaster. 
Listing of Jad decompilation of DateTime.class (abbreviated): 
public class a 01 
02 
03 
04 
05 
06 
07 
08 
09 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
public static void main(String as[]) 
{ 
(new a()) .a (); 
public void a() 
{ 
boolean flag = c; 
Date date = new Date(); 
System.out.println(String.format (a, new Object[] 
date.toString ()})); 
if(flag) 
b = !b; 
private static final String a; 
public static boolean b; 
public static boolean c; 
static 
{ 
"'?X@MA%O\005@@wY\001ZQw\\\016J\024#T\rK\024>N@\013Gy"; 
-1; 
goto _L1 
_L5: 
a; 
break MISSING_BLOCK_LABEL_116; 
_L1: 
JVM INSTR swap ; 
toCharArray(); 
JVM INSTR dup ; 
8.3 A Java Bytecode Code Anti-Reversing Exercise 
Use Java bytecode anti-reversing tools such as ProGuard, SandMark, and 
CafeBabe on the Java version of the Password Vault application to apply the anti-
reversing techniques Eliminating Symbolic Information and Obfuscating the Program 
with the goal of making it more difficult to disable the trial limitation. Instead of 
68 
attempting to implement a custom control flow obfuscation to inhibit static and dynamic 
analysis as was done in the solution to the Wintel machine code anti-reversing exercise, 
apply one or more of the control flow obfuscations available in SandMark and observe 
their impact by decompiling the obfuscated bytecode using Jad. Show that the Java 
bytecode reversing solution illustrated in the animated tutorial in Section 5.4 can no 
longer be carried out as demonstrated. 
8.4 Animated Solution to the Java Bytecode Anti-Reversing Exercise 
For instructional purposes, an animated solution to the exercise in Section 8.3 that 
demonstrates the use of anti-reversing tools introduced in Section 8 was created using 
Qarbon Viewlet Builder and can be viewed using Macromedia Flash Player. The tutorial 
begins with the Java Password Vault application, ProGuard, SandMark, Jad, CafeBabe, 
and Sun's Java JDK already installed on a Windows® XP machine. Fig. 8.2 contains an 
example slide from the animated solution. The animated solution for the Java bytecode 
anti-reversing exercise can be downloaded from the following location: 
> Java Bytecode Anti-Reversing Animated Solution: 
http://reversingproject.info/repository.php?fileID=8_4_l 
Begin viewing the tutorial by extmctmgpassword_vaultjava_antireversing_exercise.zip 
to a local directory and either runningpassword_vaultjava_antireversing_exercise.exe 
which should launch the standalone version of Macromedia Flash Player, or by opening 
the fi\epassword_vaultjava_antireversing_exercise_viewlet_swf.html in a Web browser. 
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• SandMaik 3.4.0 (Mystiqi 
File Help 
Diff j View f Decompile f Quick Protect f Static Birthmark | Dynamic Birthmark 
Dynamic Watermark Static Watermark Obfuscate Optimize 
Algorithm: j Class Encrypter 
Input File C:PassworcfVaultTrialJavd'obfuscatertPassworifVaiiltjar ^ i Browse 
Output File iC:\PasswordVaultTrialJava\oWuscated\PasswordVaultEncrypted.jar 
Encryption Key || 
7 ^ 
Specify an encryption key that will be used to encrypt and 
decrypt the ['".class] files in the Java archive. SandMark will 
bundle a new class in the output Java archive which 
overrides Java's default class loader to support loading the 
encrypted classes by first decrypting them. 
Obfuscate Help 
Class Encrypter encrypts class files and causes them to be decrypted at runtime. 
Figure 8.2. Sample slide from the Java anti-reversing animated tutorial. 
9 Reengineering and Reuse of Legacy Software Applications 
As stated in the introduction, the literature points to a future where the standard 
approach of "forward engineering" of software will be complimented with reverse 
engineering to rediscover the architecture and design as the actual implementation is 
being created. While any application that is greater than five years old can be considered 
"legacy", in this section we assume a more severe condition where enough time has 
passed such that an application has been enhanced and modified by several programmers, 
over several years, who have since moved on. Most computer science programs of study 
include object-oriented programming theory; this includes learning how to create 
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diagrams that illustrate the components of a system as well as their interactions during 
execution. The hope is that these diagrams will be literally translated in to program code, 
with a perfect correlation between the envisioned system and the implementation. For 
small projects, it might be fairly easy to check for consistency between the envisioned 
design, and what has been implemented, but this is not likely so for large projects. When 
reverse engineering is continuously used during software development, the information 
gained could be used to update the design diagrams at all levels of granularity [2]. The 
challenge here is for the computer programmer to interpret the information gathered from 
these reverse engineering tools. This will require the programmer to draw upon a skill-
set that ranges from low-level system concepts to high-level design. Unfortunately, the 
future offers little help in undoing the mistakes of the past. 
The problem of identifying concrete, reusable components within a software 
system is especially difficult because as [7] states, "engineers do not know how to design 
and build truly modular systems from scratch, let alone when starting from legacy code." 
In [7], Weide and Hollingsworth's main thesis is that while reverse engineering of legacy 
software is inherently intractable, some of us will inevitably find ourselves in a situation 
where no other option is available because the cost of rewriting a large, complex software 
system is prohibitive. In addition, should one choose to absorb the cost of rewriting a 
system from scratch, there are no known software development techniques that can 
guarantee a newly-designed system that will not need to be reengineered at some point 
down the road. 
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The question of whether to reengineer or reuse components of a software system 
most often arises in the context of large business or government organizations. Over time 
the processes and procedures of a business or organization will inevitably be reflected in 
the software systems that enable efficient, day-to-day operations [32]. Therefore, it is not 
possible to change processes and procedures without adjusting or enhancing the software 
systems that implement them. If good development practices were followed, a legacy 
software application is typically composed of three layers [32]: 
> Presentation Layer: components of a software system that accept input and 
generate output using various types of hardware devices. Input and output can be 
entered or analyzed by a human or another by another program. 
> Business Logic Layer: implementation of some subset of the processes and 
procedures of the business or organization that is relevant to the application. It is 
unusual for the business logic of one application to implement all of the processes 
and procedures. For example, the order processing and payroll applications are 
not likely to have much business logic in common. 
> Data Access Layer: this layer is responsible for servicing requests to store or 
retrieve data on behalf of the presentation and business logic layers. The nature of 
the code in this layer varies depending on the database technology being used. 
Technology choices range from simple sequential files to industrial-strength 
relational or hierarchical databases. 
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Fig. 9.1 illustrates the program architecture one would hope was used when when looking 
to update, reengineer, or reuse a legacy software application. 
Frontend — 
Presentation Layer 
Business Logic Layer 
Data Access Layer 
— Backend 
Figure 9.1. Layers of a well-structured legacy software application. 
Legacy applications that are not sufficiently componentized, such that their general 
organization resembles the three layers, are not good candidates for reengineering and 
reuse. More often than not, most software development projects in business are done 
under fairly aggressive time constraints, therefore it it not uncommon to find an 
interleaving of the layers—business logic in the presentation logic, and data access logic 
in the business logic. The most widely accepted technique to reuse legacy application 
components is that of Wrappering [32], where a new piece of code provides an interface 
to a legacy application component or layer without requiring code changes to it. This 
73 
technique is employed even when the complete source code of a legacy application is 
available for several reasons: (1) the number of lines of code in any one component or 
layer is extensive and poorly documented—making the cost of understanding the code 
well enough to make changes too high, (2) modifying the legacy application to be 
reusable without a wrapper would require locating all of the application's dependencies so 
that it can be recompiled and tested (3) application modernization, where a non-
traditional interface to the application such as XML in the case of Web or RESTful 
services is desired. 
Creating a wrapper to a legacy machine code application can be quite challenging 
—especially if all of the source code for the application has been lost. Unless enough of 
an application's source code remains such that it's possible to identify the names of 
reusable entry points (procedures) and their I/O data structures, attempting to reuse the 
application is haphazard at best. While it is possible to learn the names of entry points 
that have been explicitly exported by an application in the case of a DLL, the names 
don't indicate the layout of the expected I/O data structures. Probably the best way to 
discover the entry points and I/O data structures in legacy machine code is to read the 
source code of other applications which depend on it. For example, if a program a calls 
procedure 9 of program (3 passing an I/O data structure 5, and a produces correct results, 
there is good reason to believe that procedure 0 in program p can be reused by a third 
program p using signature 8. 
The COBOL programming language is most often associated with legacy 
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software applications. Typically, COBOL programs have a single entry point, which 
makes the process of identifying reusable methods all but unnecessary because, instead of 
declaring multiple entry points, it is general practice for legacy COBOL programs to 
include functional discriminators in their I/O data structure(s) that indicate the desired 
action(s) to be taken by the program on behalf of the caller. For example, a field called 
"TRANSACTION-TYPE" with the possible values "DEP", "WTH", and "BAL" would 
serve the same purpose in a COBOL program as the methods "doDeposit(8)", 
"doWithdrawl(S)", and "getBalance(8)" would serve in a Java program. 
01 BANK-ACCOUNT-INTERFACE. 
02 TRANSACTION-TYPE-CODE PIC XXX. 
83 DEPOSIT VALUE 'DEP ' . _—-—' 
88 WITHDRAWL VALUE ' W T H 1 . — — " 
88 BALANCE VALUE 'BAL ' . — — 
02 AC COUNT-NUMBER PIC X ( 3 2 ) . 
Figure 9.2. Mapping legacy functional discriminators to an object-oriented design. 
Fig. 9.2 illustrates how a functional discriminator in a legacy COBOL data structure maps 
to modern programming strategies such as object-oriented design. 
In a real-world situation, we would be looking to reuse legacy components whose 
machine code is the result of thousands of lines of high-level language statements 
(COBOL) that implement a particular business process. Instead of going through the 
error-prone process of rewriting the legacy component, which is likely decades old, we 
wish to reuse and reengineer it so that it is easily consumed by modern programs and 
BankAccount 
doDeposit(...) 
doWithdrawlf...) 
getBalance(...) 
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interfaces. Since our focus is more on reuse and reengineering of legacy code at a basic 
level, it's not necessary to encumber ourselves with a very large program in order to learn 
strategies for reuse and reengineering. Therefore, for purposes of demonstration, an 
example COBOL program SMPLCALC.cbl, which implements a simple calculator for 
integer-only arithmetic, was written to simulate a potentially useful component found in 
the business logic layer of a legacy business application. The source code for 
SMPLCALC.cbl is given Table 9.1; the program has single entry point that operates on 
the I/O data structure SMPCALC-INTERFACE. 
Table 9.1. Sample business logic component to reuse and reengineer. 
01 
02 
03 
04 
05 
06 
07 
08 
09 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
****************************************************************** 
** Simple COBOL program that performs integer arithmetic ** 
****************************************************************** 
IDENTIFICATION DIVISION. 
PROGRAM-ID. 'SMPLCALC. 
DATA DIVISION. 
WORKING-STORAGE SECTION. 
77 MSG-NUMERIC-OVERFLOW PIC X(25) 
VALUE 'Numeric overflow occurred'. 
77 MSG-SUCCESSFUL PIC X(22) 
VALUE 'Completed successfully'. 
LINKAGE SECTION. 
* Input/Output data structure 
01 SMPLCALC-INTERFACE. 
02 SI-OPERAND-1 PIC S9(9) COMP-5. 
02 SI-OPERAND-2 PIC S9(9) COMP-5. 
02 SI-OPERATION PIC X. 
88 DO-ADD VALUE '+'. 
8 8 DO-SUB VALUE '-'. 
88 DO-MUL VALUE '*'. 
02 SI-RESULT PIC S9(18) COMP-3. 
02 SI-RESULT-MESSAGE PIC X(128). 
PROCEDURE DIVISION USING 
BY REFERENCE SMPLCALC-INTERFACE. 
MAINLINE SECTION. 
* Perform requested arithmetic 
INITIALIZE SI-RESULT SI-RESULT-MESSAGE 
EVALUATE TRUE 
WHEN DO-ADD 
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30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
COMPUTE SI-RESULT = SI-OPERAND-1 + SI-OPERAND-2 
ON SIZE ERROR 
PERFORM HANDLE-SIZE-ERROR 
END-COMPUTE 
WHEN DO-SUB 
COMPUTE SI-RESULT = SI-OPERAND-1 - SI-OPERAND-2 
ON SIZE ERROR 
PERFORM HANDLE-SIZE-ERROR 
END-COMPUTE 
WHEN DO-MUL 
COMPUTE SI-RESULT = SI-OPERAND-1 * SI-OPERAND-2 
ON SIZE ERROR 
PERFORM HANDLE-SIZE-ERROR 
END-COMPUTE 
END-EVALUATE 
* Successful return 
MOVE MSG-SUCCESSFUL TO SI-RESULT-MESSAGE 
MOVE 2 TO RETURN-CODE 
GOBACK 
** Handle numeric overflow and end the program ** 
HANDLE-SIZE-ERROR. 
MOVE MSG-NUMERIC-OVERFLOW TO SI-RESULT-MESSAGE 
MOVE 16 TO RETURN-CODE 
GOBACK 
END PROGRAM 'SMPLCALC'. 
Looking at the source code for the COBOL program SMPLCALC.cbl, we can 
easily determine the entry point name and the data layout of the I/O data structure. 
However, even knowing the full details of the application's interface does not solve the 
problem of making it easily reusable from Java or C because of the differences in the 
language data type systems. For example, Packed Decimal (Computational-3) is a 
numeric type that is commonly found in COBOL mainframe programs, but is not 
directly supported in the Java and C/C++ languages. Even floating-point numbers can be 
problematic because some COBOL compilers, including IBM's, do not use the standard 
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IEEE floating point representation; they instead use decimal floating point [44]. Without 
detailing all the differences between the COBOL, Java, and C/C++ data models, it 
suffices to say that writing custom code to convert between COBOL's data model and the 
language we wish to invoke it from is error-prone and tedious and there are better 
alternatives. 
The problem of mating disparate data models so that new programs, written in 
modern languages, can interact with legacy software systems, is far from new. There are 
many commercial tools on the market that can import a COBOL data structure and 
generate Java helper classes that a programmer can use to build to meet the legacy binary 
interface using familiar getters and setters. A great many of these tools, including IBM's 
Rational Application Developer (RAD) [33], leverage Sun Microsystems J2EE Connector 
Architecture (JCA) [34] to provide a tightly coupled integration between a Java 
application running in a J2EE container (server) and an enterprise application (likely 
written in COBOL or PL/I) running on a mainframe. The JCA architecture requires a 
good deal of middleware to exist between a calling Java application running in the J2EE 
container and the COBOL application running on a legacy software system. While this 
middleware is powerful because of its capability to marshall Java data into COBOL and 
PL/I data, it cannot easily be reused for a local scenario where no server runtimes are 
involved. Fig. 9.3 illustrates how the JCA architecture is used by commercial products to 
enable legacy business applications to be accessed from Java applications running on 
distributed J2EE application servers. 
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Figure 9.3. Example JCA implementation for accessing a legacy application. 
A popular alternative to using the JCA architecture to reengineer and reuse legacy 
applications is to implement a Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) [38]. When 
migrating a legacy software system to an SOA, application programs that are candidates 
for reuse are identified. Typically, candidate applications should be well structured such 
that the business logic can be isolated, encapsulated, and made into reusable components. 
These SOA components become capable of communicating without the tight and fragile 
coupling of traditional binary interfaces because they are wrappered with a platform-
neutral interface such as XML and Web services. Once a business or organization has 
created a collection of reusable components from stable and well tested code, it becomes 
possible to quickly assemble new applications without having to rewrite and test the 
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underlying business logic. 
When XML is used as envisioned, all data, both of type character and numeric are 
represented as printable text, completely divorced from any platform-specific 
representation or encoding. The net effect is that two entities or programs can interact 
without having to know the data structures that comprise each other's binary interface. 
Of course, the XML that is exchanged cannot be arbitrary, so industry standards such as 
XML Schema (XSD) [39], [40] and Web Services Definition Language (WSDL) [41], 
[42] were developed. XML Schema is used to formally describe XML documents, while 
WSDL is used to describe services and the operations they support. Operations in Web 
services are akin to public methods in the object-oriented programming paradigm. A 
Web service is considered to be WS-I compliant [43], or generally interoperable, if it 
meets many criteria, not the least of which is using XML documents for the input and 
output of each operation. There are many criteria defined by WS-I that apply to a Web 
service definition, but this particular facet, where XML is the interoperable interface of 
choice, sets the stage for a meaningful exercise where the focus is on the activity of 
making a component from a COBOL program that is reusable from Java using XML in a 
light-weight, local environment. 
In recent history, the ability to parse and generate XML documents has been 
added to the COBOL language in many implementations including the Micro Focus and 
IBM COBOL compilers and runtimes [37], [44]. XML parsing in COBOL is 
accomplished through the use of the XML PARSE statement, which performs an event-
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driven parse of an XML document. In a event-driven parse, the initiator registers a 
handler which the XML parser invokes with each XML construct found in the document. 
For example, the start and end of an XML element would be reported as two separate 
events. XML generation in COBOL is accomplished through the use of the XML 
GENERATE statement, which, given a COBOL data structure and an output buffer, will 
generate XML that has the same hierarchical organization as the data structure [37, 44]. 
By default, the XML GENERATE statement will form XML element and attribute names 
using the name of each member in the COBOL data structure. This can be less than ideal 
in circumstances where data structure members have cryptic names that don't conform to 
the spirit of XML where each XML element and attribute is given a name that describes 
its content. Fortunately, Micro Focus COBOL provides the capability to assign custom 
XML element and attribute names to each data structure member, which allows for 
defining an XML Schema that has meaningful element and attribute names [37]. 
In the exercise which accompanies this section, we are asked to create a language-
neutral XML interface to the "legacy" SMPCALC.cbl application program and invoke it 
from a Java program which incidentally makes it reusable to other Java programs. To 
describe an XML interface to the legacy COBOL program so that other programs may 
consume it, an XML Schema must be created; this can be done with a tool that can 
generate XML Schema from a COBOL data declaration, or by hand using an XML editor. 
Once an XML interface has been described using XML Schema, it is necessary to 
implement XML marshalling layers between the calling Java program and the legacy 
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COBOL program. In the example exercise, the XML marshalling layer for each program 
is implemented in the target language itself. So that the Java program can generate and 
consume XML based on the XML Schema that describes the interface to the COBOL 
program, we employ the Java Architecture for XML Binding (JAXB) [35]. JAXB 
facilitates the conversion of Java objects to XML and vice versa. Sun's Java JDK 
includes a command-line utility xjc which generates Java marshalling code from an XML 
Schema—making it quite easy to write a Java program which consumes and generates 
XML based on an XML Schema. While generation of XML is nicely handled in COBOL 
by the XML GENERATE statement, consuming XML involves coding an event handler 
for the XML PARSE statement. Of course, complete code for both the Java and COBOL 
XML marshalling layers is included in the solution to the exercise, so if COBOL is a 
foreign language to you, there's no need for concern. Once the XML marshalling layers 
are in place, there's one more loose end that needs to be tied up; and that is to figure out 
how to pass XML documents between the two layers. Since we are in a local scenario, 
TCP/IP is not an option, therefore a thin Java Native Interface (JNI) layer is needed 
through which the Java and COBOL marshalling layers can exchange XML; note that the 
COBOL XML marshalling layer invokes the legacy COBOL application. Fig. 9.4 
illustrates the program architecture for the exercise. 
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Figure 9.4. Architecture for legacy application reengineering and reuse from Java. 
In order to try out the code in this section and complete the exercise that 
accompanies it, a COBOL compiler and runtime environment are needed. The COBOL 
programs in this section, and in the solution to the exercise which accompanies it, were 
written, compiled, and run using a student version of Micro Focus Net Express [37]. At 
the time of this writing, no reasonably functional open source COBOL compiler was 
available that could compile, link, and run even the most simple COBOL program given 
in this section; this may have to do with the fact that COBOL remains a very lucrative 
enterprise for many businesses, so there is little interest in giving away implementations 
to the open source community. For example, the COBOL for GCC project has not made 
significant progress yet on the code generation part of the compiler [36]. When and if an 
open source COBOL compiler gets off the ground, it will be interesting to see what 
features of the commercial COBOL compilers are implemented. 
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9.1 Legacy Software Reengineering and Reuse Exercise 
Provide a command-line (or graphical) interactive Java front-end to the legacy 
COBOL application SMPLCALC.cbl by implementing the program architecture 
illustrated in Fig. 9.4. Before starting the exercise, download and extract the following 
archive file located here http://reversmgproject.info/repositoiy php?fileID=9_l_l. 
Follow these steps to complete the exercise: 
1) Locate the interface data structure for SMPLCALC.cbl in the copybook (source 
include file) SMPLCALC.cpy. There is only one data structure in the copybook. 
2) Create an XML Schema which represents all of the data in the SMPLCALC-
INTERFACE COBOL data structure. Instead of writing this by hand, you can use 
the Micro Focus Net Express CBL2XML wizard [37]. 
3) Write a Java interface ISimpleCalculator.java for three computation types supported 
by SMPLCALC.cbl using appropriate method signatures: 
a) long doAdd(int, int) throws java.lang.ArithmeticException. 
b) long doSubtract(int, int) throws Java.lang.ArithmeticException 
c) long doMultipy(int, int) throws Java.lang.ArithmeticException 
4) Write a Java class JSimpleCalculator.java that implements the interface defined in 
ISimpleCalculator.java and provides a user interface for: 
a) Specifying which computation (add, sub, mul) is desired. 
b) Specifying the operands to the computation. 
c) Displaying the result of the computation (can be an error). 
5) Use the Java command-line utility xjc, in combination with the XML Schema 
created in Step 2, to generate Java to XML marshalling code (JAXB). Update 
JSimpleCalculator.java to call this marshalling code. 
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6) Write a small C/C++ JNI program JavalCblXmlBridge.cpp which exports a method 
"Java2SmplCalc" which: 
a) Invokes XML2CALC.cbl (see Step 7), passing the XML document received 
from JSimpleCalculator.java. 
b) Returns the XML document generated by XML2CALC.cbl (see Step 7) on 
return from SMPLCALC.cbl to JSimpleCalculator.java. 
7) Write a COBOL program XML2CALC.cbl which: 
a) Marshalls XML received from the Java2CblXmlBridge.cpp, based on the XML 
Schema created in Step 2, into SMPLCALC-INTERFACE. 
b) Invokes SMPLCALC.cbl, passing SMPLCALC-INTERFACE by reference. 
c) Marshalls SMPLCALC-INTERFACE back to XML before returning to 
Java2CblXmlBridge. cpp. 
8) Compile XML2CALC.cbl and link it with the machine/object code for 
SMPLCALC.cbl (SMPLCALC.obj). 
a) To simulate a situation where only partial source code for an application is 
available, do not recompile SMPLCALC.cbl; use the object file (machine code) 
that comes with this exercise instead. 
9) Create a DLL that can be loaded an used by JSimpleCalculator.java by compiling 
and linking Java2CblXmlBridge.cpp with the object code for XML2CALC.cbl. 
10) Update JSimpleCalculator.java to use the XAC-generated marshalling code to 
send/receive XML through the JNI method defined in Step 8 and display the results 
of the computations performed downstream by SMPLCALC.cbl. 
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9.2 Legacy Software Reengineering and Reuse Exercise Solution 
This section gives a solution to the exercise given in Section 9.1. The details of 
the solution are organized according to the steps of the exercise. Software requirements 
to build and test the solution include: Sun's Java JDK SE V6, Microsoft Visual C++ 
Studio Express 2008, and Micro Focus Net Express v5.1 (COBOL). 
Most of the source listings in this section are abbreviated, and some of the steps 
are skipped. The complete source and binaries for he solution can be downloaded from 
http://reversingproject.info/repository.php?fileID=9_2_l. 
! 1) Locate the interface data structure for SMPLCALC.cbl in the copybook (source 
include file) SMPLCALC.cpy. There is only one data structure in the copybook. 
The interface data structure for SMPLCALC.cbl is located in SMPLCALC.cpy and is 
named SMPLCALC-INTERFACE (see Table 9.2). COBOL data structures begin with a 
level 01 declaration and are usually hierarchical but can be elementary. 
Table 9.2. Interface data structure SMPLCALC-INTERFACE in SMPLCALC.cpy. 
01 
02 
03 
04 
05 
06 
07 
08 
09 
10 
* I 
01 
nput/Output data structure 
SMPLCALC-INTERFACE. 
02 
02 
02 
02 
02 
SI-OPERAND-1 PIC S9(9) COMP-5. 
SI-OPERAND-2 PIC S9(9) COMP-5. 
SI-OPERATION PIC X. 
88 DO-ADD VALUE '+'. 
88 DO-SUB VALUE '-'. 
8 8 DO-MUL VALUE '*'. 
SI-RESULT PIC S9(18) COMP-5. 
SI-RESULT-MESSAGE PIC X(128). 
86 
2) Create an XML Schema which represents all of the data in the SMPLCALC-
INTERFACE COBOL data structure. Instead of writing this by hand, you can use 
the Micro Focus Net Express CBL2XML wizard [3 7]. 
The CBL2XML wizard in Micro Focus Net Express conveniently generates an XML 
Schema from a COBOL data structure. The result of using SMPLCALC.cpy as input to 
the CBL2XML wizard is given in Table 9.3. 
Table 9.3. XML Schema generated from the COBOL data structure. 
<?xml version="l.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<schema xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2 0 01/XMLSchema" 
elementFormDefault="qualified"> 
<element name="SMPLCALC-INTERFACE"> 
<complexType> 
<sequence> 
<element name="SI-OPERAND-l"> 
<simpleType> 
<restriction base="integer"> 
<totalDigits value="9" /> 
</restriction> 
</simpleType> 
</element> 
<element name="SI-OPERAND-2"> 
<simpleType> 
<restriction base="integer"> 
<totalDigits value="9" /> 
</restriction> 
</simpleType> 
</element> 
<element name="SI-OPERATION"> 
<simpleType> 
<restriction base="string"> 
<enumeration value="+" /> 
<enumeration value="-" /> 
<enumeration value="*" /> 
</restriction> 
</simpleType> 
</element> 
<element name="SI-RESULT"> 
<simpleType> 
<restriction base="integer"> 
<totalDigits value="18" /> 
</restriction> 
</simpleType> 
</element> 
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27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
<element name="SI-RESULT-MESSAGE"> 
<simpleType> 
<restriction base="string"> 
<maxLength value="128" /> 
</restriction> 
</simpleType> 
</element> 
</sequence> 
</complexType> 
</element> 
</schema> 
4) Write a Java class JSimpleCalculator.java that implements the interface defined in 
ISimpleCalculator.java and provides a user interface for: 
a) Specifying which computation (add, sub, mul) is desired. 
b) Specifying the operands to the computation. 
c) Displaying the result of the computation (can be an error). 
There is a great deal of flexibility in this part of the exercise. Some examples of 
the types of user interfaces that can be implemented include: command-line interactive 
(console-based), graphical, Java servlet (Web-based). A command-line interactive 
interface was implemented for the solution. A screen capture of the interface is given 
Fig. 9.5. Notice that a debugging mode is available to trace the various steps in the 
process of exchanging XML between the Java and COBOL XML marshalling layers. 
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**************************************************** 
** Program: Java Front-end to COBOL Calculator ** 
** Purpose: Demonstrate reengineering and reuse ** 
** of a COBOL program from Java by ** 
** establishing an XML bridge leveraging ** 
** JAXB, JNI, and COBOL XML support. -* 
** Author: Teodoro Cipresso ** 
** tcipress@hotmail.com ** 
**************************************************** 
Select a task from the following menu: 
(1) Addition 
(2) Subtraction 
(3) Multiplication 
(4) Toggle Debug ON 
(5) Quit Program 
Specify selection: 3 
Specify integer operand #1: 12 
Specify integer operand #2: 12 
[***] COBOL multiplication result: 144 
Figure 9.5. Console-based Java interface to the legacy COBOL program. 
5) Use the Java command-line utility xjc, in combination with the XML Schema created 
in Step 2, to generate Java to XML marshalling code (JAXB). Update 
JSimpleCalculator.java to call this marshalling code. 
The xjc command-line utility generates two types of artifacts for each global (top 
level) element in an XML Schema: (1) Java classes that expose getters and setters for the 
data contained in instances of the XML Schema (XML documents), (2) Java classes that 
serve as metadata for the JAXB XML marshalling engine. In the solution archive file, 
the two classes generated by JAXB are: SmplCalcJaxbFactory.java (getters and setters) 
and SmplCalcJaxbMarshaller.java (JAXB XML marshalling metadata). Note these are 
not the default class names generated by xjc. 
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To cleanly integrate the JAXB marshalling with JSimpleCalculator.java, 
SmplCalcJaxbMarshaller.java, which encapsulates the interaction with the JAXB, was 
created. Table 9.4 gives an abbreviated listing of this class. 
Table 9.4. Partial listing of SmplCalcJaxbMarshaller.java interaction with JAXB. 
01 
02 
03 
04 
05 
06 
07 
08 
09 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
private static JAXBContext jaxbContext = null; 
private static Marshaller marshaller = null; 
private static Unmarshaller unmarshaller = null; 
static 
{ 
try 
{ 
jaxbContext = JAXBContext.newlnstance(SMPLCALCINTERFACE.class) ; 
marshaller = jaxbContext.createMarshaller(); 
unmarshaller = jaxbContext.createUnmarshaller(); 
} catch (JAXBException _je) {...} 
public static String serializeXML(SMPLCALCINTERFACE request) 
16 { 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
ByteArrayOutputStream xmlBytes = new ByteArrayOutputStream(); 
try 
{ 
marshaller.marshal(request, xmlBytes); 
} catch (JAXBException _je) {...} 
String xmlDoc = new String(xmlBytes.toByteArray()); 
return xmlDoc; 
public static SMPLCALCINTERFACE loadXML(String xmlDoc) 
{ 
SMPLCALCINTERFACE response = null; 
ByteArraylnputStream xmlBytes = new 
ByteArraylnputStream(xmlDoc.getBytes ()); 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
try 
{ 
response = (SMPLCALCINTERFACE)unmarshaller.unmarshal(xmlBytes); 
} catch (JAXBException _je) {...} 
return response; 
Next we need to update the add, subtract, and multiply methods in 
JSimpleCalculator.java to use SmplCalcJaxbMarshaller.java to generate and consume 
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XML in preparation to use the JNI XML bridge to the legacy COBOL application. Table 
9.5 contains an abbreviated listing of the updated to JsimpleCalculator.java. Note that 
the call to method smplCalcXmllnterface is commented out. This is a call to the JNI 
XML bridge which will be implemented in a later step. 
Table 9.5. Updates to JSimpleCalculator.java in support of JAXB marshalling. 
01 
02 
03 
public long doAddfint _lstOp, int _2ndOp) 
{ 
SMPLCALCINTERFACE addResult = invokeXmllnterface("+", IstOp, 
2ndOp); 
04 
05 
06 
07 
return addResult.getSIRESULT().longValue(); 
public SMPLCALCINTERFACE invokeXmllnterface(String calcType, int 
_lstOp, int _2ndOp) 
08: { 
09: SMPLCALCINTERFACE inputData = new SmplCalcJaxbFactory(). 
createSMPLCALCINTERFACE(); 
10: inputData.setSIOPERATION(calcType); 
11: inputData.setSIOPERANDl(Biglnteger.valueOf(_lstOp) ) ; 
12: inputData.setSIOPERAND2(Biglnteger.valueOf(_2ndOp)); 
13: inputData.setSIRESULTMESSAGE(""); 
14: inputData.setSIRESULT(Biglnteger.valueOf(0)); 
15: String inputXml = SmplCalcJaxbMarshaller.serializeXML(inputData); 
16: // TODO JNI: String outputXml = smplCalcXmllnterface(inputXml); 
17: SMPLCALCINTERFACE outputData = SmplCalcJaxbMarshaller. 
loadXML(outputXml); 
18: return outputData; 
19: } 
6) Write a small C/C++ JNI program Java2CblXmlBridge.cpp which exports a method 
| "Java2SmplCalc" which: 
a) Invokes XML2CALC.cbl (see Step 7), passing the XML document received from 
JSimpleCalculator.java. 
b) Returns the XML document generated by XMLlCALC.cbl (see Step 7) on 
return from SMPLCALC.cbl to JSimpleCalculator.java 
Sun's Java SDK includes the command-line utility javah that generates 
appropriate C/C++ header files for a native method declaration in a Java class. The 
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generated header file will contain a function prototype that reflects the fully qualified 
name and signature of the method. Using the function prototype, it is the responsibility 
of the programmer to write a C/C++ method that conforms to it and interacts properly 
with the JVM. Please note that garbage collection does not apply to any memory 
allocated by the native code, so be sure to free it. 
To generate the JNI header file, we must first declare a native method in 
JsimpleCalculator.java that we wish to implement in C/C++. In addition, we must also 
indicate the name of the DLL Java will need to load in order to call it. Table 9.6 contains 
the needed additions to JsimpleCalculator.java to declare the native method. Note that 
on the System.loadLibrary call, the file extension of the DLL file is not specified. 
Table 9.6. Example native method declaration for the JNI XML bridge. 
01: public class JSimpleCalculator implements ISimpleCalculator 
02: { 
03: native String smplCalcXmllnterface(String xmldoc); 
04: static 
05: { 
06: System.loadLibrary("Java2CblXmlBridge") ; 
07: } 
08: ... 
09: } 
When using the javah command-line utility, keep in mind that it operates on 
*.class files instead of *.java files; this is because the Java reflection APIs are used to get 
the qualified name and signature of the native method declaration instead of having to 
parse the source file. To generate a C/C++ header file from the JSimpleCalculator.class 
file, issue the command "javah -jni 
info.reversingproject.jsimplecalculator.JSimpleCalculator. " Table 9.7 gives the source 
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for the JNI program Java2CblXmlBridge.cpp, which implements the JNI method 
described in the generated header file. 
Table 9.7. Example implementation of the Java to COBOL JNI XML bridge. 
01: #include "package_JSimpleCalculator.h" 
02: #include "cobcall.h" 
/* 
* Class : info_reversingproject_jsimplecalculator_JSimpleCalculator 
* Method: smplCalcXmllnterface 
* Signature: (Ljava/lang/String;)Ljava/lang/String; 
*/ 
03: jstring JNICALL 
Java_info_reversingproject_j simplecalculator__JSimpleCalculator_smplCalc 
Xmllnterface (JNIEnv *env, jobject parent_obect, jstring xml_doc) 
04 
05 
06 
07 
08 
09 
10 
{ 
// Get input XML document passed from Java 
jboolean iscopy; 
jstring output_xml; 
char *xml_buffer = NULL; 
char *xml_buffer_ptr = NULL; 
const char *xml_input = (*env)->GetStringUTFChars(env, xml_doc, 
Siscopy); 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
int xml_len = strlen(xml_input); 
// Allocate XML I/O buffer and copy input XML 
xml_buffer = (char*)malloc(32767); 
memset(xml_buffer, 0x00, 32767); // initialize 
memcpy(xml_buffer, xml_input, xml_len); 
// Free JNI memory used for MBCS to SBCS conversion 
(*env)->ReleaseStringUTFChars(env, xml_doc, &iscopy); 
// call COBOL to XML marshalling layer, passing XML I/O buffer 
cobinitO; // Initialize Micro Focus COBOL runtime 
XML2CALC(&xml_len, xml_buffer); // Call COBOL 
// Null terminate XML returned from COBOL 
xml_buffer_ptr = xml_buffer; 
xml_buffer_ptr += xml_len; 
*(xml_buffer_ptr) = 0x00; 
// Allocate UTF version of XML to return to Java 
output_xml = (*env)->NewStringUTF(env, xml_buffer); 
// Free XML I/O buffer 
free(xml_buffer); 
// Return XML generated by COBOL as Java String 
return output_xml; 
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7) Write a COBOL program XML2CALC.cbl which: 
a) Marshalls XML received from the Java2CblXm.lBridge.cpp, based on the XML 
Schema created in Step 2, into SMPLCALC-INTERFACE. 
b) Invokes SMPLCALC.cbl, passing SMPLCALC-INTERFACE by reference. 
c) Marshalls SMPLCALC-INTERFACE back into XML document before returning 
to Java2CblXmlBridge.cpp. 
Using the recently added XML support in COBOL [37, 44], parsing and 
generation of XML is fairly straight-forward. Two statements in the COBOL language, 
XML PARSE and XML GENERATE, are used to implement the program 
XML2CALC.cbl. Note that the XML GENERATE statement only allows assignment of 
non-default XML element names to data structure members when reading or writing from 
an XML file. Since we are working with XML in a stream, the XML Schema defined in 
the solution to Step 2 uses the default XML element names generated by the Micro Focus 
Net Express CBL2XML wizard. Table 9.8 gives the source code for XML2CALC.cbl, the 
XML layer to the legacy COBOL application. 
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Table 9.8. Implementation of a COBOL XML layer to the legacy application. 
$set preprocess(prexml) o(foo.pp) warn endp 
K i t * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
** Wrapper program that provides an XML interface to SMPLCALC ** 
i t * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
IDENTIFICATION DIVISION. 
PROGRAM-ID. 'XML2 CALC' . 
DATA DIVISION. 
WORKING-STORAGE SECTION. 
* Input/Output data structure 
01 SMPLCALC-INTERFACE. 
02 SI-OPERAND-1 PIC S9(9) COMP-5. 
02 SI-OPERAND-2 PIC S9(9) COMP-5. 
02 SI-OPERATION PIC X. 
8 8 DO-ADD VALUE '+'. 
8 8 DO-SUB VALUE 
8 8 DO-MUL VALUE '*'. 
02 SI-RESULT PIC S9(18) COMP-5. 
02 SI-RESULT-MESSAGE PIC X(128). 
* XML parsing state 
01 XML-PARSE-STATE. 
02 CURR-ELE-NAME PIC X(256). 
02 CURR-ELE-CONT PIC X(256). 
LINKAGE SECTION. 
01 XML-DOC-LEN PIC S9(9) COMP-5. 
01 XML-DOC-TXT PIC X(32767). 
PROCEDURE DIVISION USING XML-DOC-LEN XML-DOC-TXT. 
MAINLINE SECTION. 
* Parse XML into SMPLCALC-INTERFACE 
XML PARSE XML-DOC-TXT(1:XML-DOC-LEN) 
PROCESSING PROCEDURE XML-HANDLER 
END-XML 
* Invoke legacy COBOL application SMPLCALC 
CALL 'SMPLCALC USING SMPLCALC-INTERFACE 
* Generate XML from SMPLCALC-INTERFACE 
XML GENERATE XML-DOC-TXT FROM SMPLCALC-INTERFACE 
COUNT IN XML-DOC-LEN 
END-XML 
* Return to client program 
GOBACK 
*
 + + 
* | XML event handler for marshalling XML into COBOL data I 
* + + 
XML-HANDLER. 
EVALUATE XML-EVENT 
WHEN 'START-OF-ELEMENT' 
MOVE XML-TEXT TO CURR-ELE-NAME 
WHEN 'CONTENT-CHARACTERS' 
EVALUATE CURR-ELE-NAME 
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50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
WHEN 'SI-OPERAND-1' 
MOVE FUNCTION NUMVAL(XML-TEXT) TO SI-OPERAND-1 
WHEN 'SI-OPERAND-2' 
MOVE FUNCTION NUMVAL(XML-TEXT) TO SI-OPERAND-2 
WHEN 'SI-OPERATION' 
MOVE XML-TEXT TO SI-OPERATION 
END-EVALUATE 
WHEN 'END-OF-ELEMENT' 
INITIALIZE CURR-ELE-NAME 
END-EVALUATE 
END PROGRAM 'XML2CALC. 
\ 10) Update JSimpleCalculator.java to use the X/C-generated marshalling code to 
send/receive XML through the JNI method defined in Step 8 and display the results 
| of the computations performed downstream by SMPLCALC.cbl. 
To begin using the JNI XML bridge, create or uncomment a line in your code that 
corresponds to the bolded line in Table 9.5. Essentially, code a call to method 
Java2CblXmlBridge.smplCalcXmlInterface(inputXmlDoc), passing the JAXB generated 
XML document, to invoke the legacy COBOL application SMPLCALC.cbl through JNI 
and the XML layers. Table 9.9 lists the results of running the complete solution code for 
the exercise with debug tracing turned on. 
Table 9.9. Example run of the solution code with debug statements turned on. 
01 
02 
03 
04 
05 
06 
07 
08 
09 
10 
11 
12 
**************************************************** 
** Program: Java Front-end to COBOL Calculator ** 
** Purpose: Demonstrate reengineering and reuse ** 
** of a COBOL program from Java by ** 
** establishing an XML bridge leveraging ** 
** JAXB, JNI, and COBOL XML support. ** 
** Author: Teodoro Cipresso ** 
** tcipress@hotmail.com ** 
**************************************************** 
Select a task from the following menu: 
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(1) Addition 
(2) Subtraction 
(3) Multiplication 
(4) Toggle Debug OFF 
(5) Quit Program 
Specify selection: 3 
Specify integer operand #1: 16 
Specify integer operand #2: 32 
[D] JSimpleCalculator.doMultiply(16, 32) 
[D] JSimpleCalculator.invokeXmllnterface(*, 16, 32) 
[D] SmplCal c JaxbMar sha H e r .serial izeXML () 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31: [D] SmplCalcJaxbMarshaller.serializeXML().xmlDoc[<?xml 
version="l.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="yes" 7XSMPLCALC-
INTERFACEXSI-OPERAND-l>16</SI-OPERAND-lXSI-OPERAND-2>32</SI-OPERAND-
2><SI-OPERATION>*</SI-OPERATIONXSI-RESULT>0</SI-RESULTXSI-RESULT-
MESSAGEX/SI-RESULT-MESSAGEX/SMPLCALC-INTERFACED 
32: 
33: [D] JSimpleCalculator.invokeXmllnterface(): Before call to 
Java2CblXmlBridge 
34: 
35: [D] JSimpleCalculator.invokeXmllnterface(): After call to 
Java2CblXmlBridge 
36: 
37: [D] SmplCalcJaxbMarshaller.loadXMLO .xmlDoc[<SMPLCALC-
INTERFACEXSI-OPERAND-l>16</SI-OPERAND-lXSI-OPERAND-2>32</SI-OPERAND-
2><SI-OPERATION>*</SI-OPERATIONXSI-RESULT>512</SI-RESULTXSI-RESULT-
MESSAGE>Completed success fully</SI-RESULT-MESSAGEX/SMPLCALC-
INTERFACE>] 
38: 
39: [***] COBOL multiplication result: 512 
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10 Identifying, Monitoring, and Reporting Malware 
Malware describes a category of software that for one reason or another does not 
fit the description of a program that always operates in a way that benefits the user [5J. 
Of course, those of us who have ever used software might contend that this definition of 
malware will cause programs that we use every day to be categorized as malware. For 
example, the word processor used to write this paragraph has crashed more than once 
during the writing of this paper, and, in that regard, it's not acting in a way that benefits 
the user. To tighten the definition of malware, let's qualify it a bit: the malicious or 
annoying behaviors of malware are intentional, not the result of one or more bugs. There 
are currently five types of malware that affect computer systems [5] [21]: 
> Viruses: a virus is malware that requires some deliberate action to help it spread. 
For example, a user downloading and installing an infected program that in turn 
infects emails sent by the user. 
> Worms: a worm is similar to a virus but can spread by itself over computer 
networks. Worms have superseded viruses as the popular choice of hackers. 
> Trojan horses: a Trojan horse is software that has hidden and unadvertised 
functionality that occurs during normal use. 
> Backdoor: a backdoor is a vulnerability purposely embedded in software that 
allows an attacker to connect to the users machine with malicious intent. 
> Rabbit: a rabbit is a program that exhausts system resources. Types of resources 
that can be exhausted include memory, disk space, CPU time. 
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To experiment with most of the types of malware listed here is dangerous. Therefore, if 
one decides to try one's hand at analyzing real-life malware, using the machine code and 
bytecode reversing techniques demonstrated in this paper, one should do so in a carefully 
prepared environment. One should not install any malware on a computer that must 
remain in operating condition. Worms and backdoors can be especially dangerous 
because they can propagate to other systems on computer networks. Be aware that using 
virtualization tools such as VMware to create secondary operating system images on 
which to install malware can still result in the infection of the primary operating system, 
especially if the VMware-hosted image has connectivity enabled. 
The goal of this section is to help you become familiar with using software tools 
to identify, monitor, report, and securely delete software that you suspect to be malicious. 
Since it's not practical to ask that you install a virus, worm, backdoor, or rabbit on your 
machine, we are left with the possibility of a guaranteed benign software Trojan. It's 
important to note here that malware usually isn't of just one type; for example, 3 of the 
top 10 malicious codes families reported in 2008 were Trojans with a backdoor 
component [45]. It turns that focusing on software Trojans is appropriate because as 
Symantec's 2009 Global Internet Security Threat Report [45] states, "Trojans made up 68 
percent of the volume of the top 50 malicious code samples reported in 2008", and "Five 
of the top 10 staged downloaders in 2008 were Trojans." 
For the vast majority of us, the story of the Trojan horse from antiquity is quite 
familiar. Essentially, the Greeks, in a 10-year siege against the city of Troy, devised a 
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brilliant plan of putting 40 of their best soldiers into the body of a large wooden horse 
while the rest of the army sailed away out of sight. The Trojans, assuming that the 
Greeks had given up, pulled the horse into their city as a trophy of their victory. As night 
fell over the city of Troy, the Greek army sailed back to shore. Meanwhile, the soldiers in 
the Trojan horse silenced some guards and opened the gates—allowing the Greek army to 
flood in and take the city by surprise. 
So what does all this have to do with software? Not too surprising, a Trojan 
software program is one that is not entirely what it seems. For example, imagine a 
program is offered for free on the Internet that claims to be able to convert audio files 
between different formats. The program fits the needs of many, and is definitely the right 
price, so it has a large install base. What users of the program are not told is that while 
the program is performing its advertised functions, it will perform other annoying or 
malicious tasks in the background such as: scanning the system for sensitive information 
and uploading it to a rogue site, affecting the stability and performance of the system by 
doing repeated expensive operations. 
In 1996, Mark Russinovich founded a company called "Winternals Software" 
where he was the chief software architect on a comprehensive suite of tools for 
diagnosing, debugging, and repairing Windows® systems and applications [46]. Mark's 
company has since been purchased by Microsoft and his suite of tools have been 
rebranded "Windows Sysinteraals" and are offered for free on Microsoft Technet. An 
example of one of the more powerful tools in the Sysinternals suite is the Process 
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Monitor. The Process Monitor can capture detailed information about any running 
process in a Windows® system including: filesystem, registry, and network activity. Just 
the Process Monitor alone is helpful in analyzing the behavior of an application when 
making the determination of whether or not it is malicious. As an aside, Mark's story is 
an interesting one because he is recognized as a true expert on the internals of Windows® 
even though he did not participate in its development—a true testament to what can be 
learned about software through reverse engineering. At the time of this writing, the 
Sysinteraals suite contained 66 different utilities, but we'll focus on the most useful one 
in this context of analyzing the behavior of malware: Process Monitor. In the exercise 
that accompanies this section, it is recommended that you use Process Monitor to 
complete it. If you have the opportunity to experiment with other tools in the 
Sysinternals suite, you are encouraged to do so. The following description of Process 
Monitor is given on the Windows Sysinternals web site [46]: 
"Process Monitor is an advanced monitoring tool for Windows® that shows 
real-time file system, Registry and process/thread activity. It combines the 
features of two legacy Sysinternals utilities, Filemon and Regmon, and adds 
an extensive list of enhancements including rich and non-destructive filtering, 
comprehensive event properties such session IDs and user names, reliable 
process information, full thread stacks with integrated symbol support for 
each operation, simultaneous logging to a file, and much more. Its uniquely 
powerful features will make Process Monitor a core utility in your system 
troubleshooting and malware hunting toolkit. " 
Fig. 10.1 contains a capture of a Process Monitor session where the filesystem activity of 
the Password Vault application is recorded. When using Process Monitor, you can 
selectively monitor registry, filesystem, network, and thread activity. 
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File Edit 
£? H 
Event Filter Tools Options Help / 
i ^ m E> i v A ® i 1 
Process Name PIP |; Operation 
1 PasswordVault. exe 
IPasswordVault.exe 
63 PasswordVault. exe 
IPasswordVault.exe 
jPasswordVault.exe 
63 PasswordVault. exe 
JPasswordVault.exe 
JPasswordVault.exe 
JPasswordVault.exe 
JPasswordVault.exe 
1 Pass wordVault. exe 
] Pass wordVault. exe 
JPasswordVault.exe 
JPasswordVault.exe 
IPasswordVault.exe 
5072 0JRP_MJ 
5072 y*FAST 10. 
5072 EMRP_MJ. 
5072 0URP_MJ_ 
5072 yj jRP_MJ 
5072 0URP_MJ 
5072 0JRP_MJ 
5072 0URP_MJ_ 
5072 0URP_MJ_ 
5072 &.IRP_MJ_ 
5072 BURP_MJ 
5072 0URP_MJ 
5072 @URP_MJ 
5072 0JRP_MJ 
5072 gklRP_MJ 
.CREATE C:\PasswordVaultTrialCpp\user01 
.QUE RY_... C APasswordVauItT rialCpp\user01 
.READ CAPasswordVaultTrialCpp\user01 
CLEANUP CAPasswordVaultTrialCpp\user01 
.Q UE RY_... C APasswordVauItT rialCpp 
CR EAT E C: \PasswordVaultT rialCpp\user01 
.CREATE C APasswordVauItT rialCpp 
CLEANUP C APasswordVauItT rialCpp 
.CLOSE C APasswordVauItT rialCpp 
WRITE C APasswordVauItT rialCpp\user01 
.CLEANUP CAPasswordVauItTrialCpp\user01 
CLO SE C APasswordVauItT rialCpp\user01 
READ C:
 /: 
CLEANUr 
CL0SE
 Save the vault file. 
;dat' 
d a t | 
dat p. 
dat| : 
''&.. 
m 
datss*: 
dat 
dat 
dat 
| [Showing 49 of 36,344 events {0.13%) Backed by page file 
JU 
^4 
Figure 10.1. Process Monitor session for the Password Vault application. 
Most of the malicious operations carried out by Trojans can be detected using 
Process Monitor, including those that contain Backdoors. Of course, Process Monitor 
itself doesn't identify malware, it simply reports what a process is doing. With a little bit 
of ingenuity, one can identify activities that don't seem to fit with the advertised 
functionality of a program. For example, a program that accesses registry keys, files, or 
network locations that are unrelated to it, is probably malicious. It's common practice 
these days for users to download free software from the Internet, and because we've been 
convinced that open-source software, which is sometimes confused with free software, 
should have the fewest number of vulnerabilities, we do it without much afterthought. 
Incidentally, the data on the number of vulnerabilities found in popular Internet browsers 
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does not support this belief. [45] reports that "Mozilla browsers were affected by 99 new 
vulnerabilities in 2008, more than any other browser; there were 47 new vulnerabilities 
identified in Internet Explorer, 40 in Apple Safari, 35 in Opera™, and 11 in Google® 
Chrome." It seems counter-intuitive that an open-source browser would have twice as 
many security holes than a closed-source browser like Internet Explorer. Mozilla is not 
malware, but it's interesting to note that in the case of software, open-source doesn't 
guarantee security. Becoming familiar with the Windows® Sysinternals suite can help 
you evaluate whether the software on your Windows® machine is acting in your best 
interest. 
If you suspect a particular program to be malware, it can be submitted online to a 
service called ThreatExpert [47]. ThreatExpert is a Web-based tool that supports 
submission of software executables that are to be evaluated against an on-line malware 
database. The tool analyzes the instruction sequences in submitted executables and 
attempts to match them against those of known malware. Matching against existing 
malware is just one part of ThreatExpert's automated engine; the service actually tries to 
execute suspected malware in an isolated environment in order to perform heuristic 
analysis of its actions. An example of a report generated by ThreatExpert for a 
particularly dangerous piece of malware is shown in Fig. 10.2. The figure contains only 
the top-level summary of the report whereas the full report contains much more detail, 
such as filesystem, memory, registry, network and other activity. Note that all of the 
malicious behaviors of the submitted executable could have been learned by 
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m ThreatExpert 
Submission Summary: 
a Submission detai ls: 
• Submission received: 2 May 2009, 13:53:25 
• Processing t ime: 6 min 33 sec 
• Submit ted sample: 
File MDS: 0xD5D9730AF3DE7006C9940791E96B20CE 
File SHA-1 : OxC4AD816CC3AD6206735E24903DC58729AAB6B388 
Filesize: 406,771 bytes 
Alias: 
Virus,Win32.Parite.b • [Kaspersky Lab] 
Virus,Win32,Parite • [ Ikarus] 
Summary of the findings: 
What 's been found 
A network-aware worm that uses known exploit(s) in order to 
repl icate across vulnerable networks. 
MS04-011 : LSASS Overflow exploit - replication across TCP 445 
(common for Sasser, Bobax, Kibuv, Kongo, Gaobot, Spybot , Randex, 
o ther IRC Bots). 
: Replication across networks by exploiting weakly restr ic ted shares 
! (common for Randex family of worms). 
1 Communication wi th a remote IRC server. 
I Downloads/requests other files from In ternet , 
I Creates a s tar tup registry entry. 
; There were some system executable files modified, which might 
1 indicate the presence of a PE-file infector. 
I 
| Contains character is t ics of an identif ied securi ty risk. 
Severi ty 
Level 
Bssssssms] 
;:i@gg@iSe@i'; 
filflQQJl 
[9@HSS3@SEI9i 
Figure 10.2. Example ThreatExpert report summary for submitted malware. 
monitoring it using Process Monitor, though it would have taken much more time. 
To facilitate the exercise which accompanies this section, a benign Java software 
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Trojan named "Alarm Clock" was written. The Alarm Clock program is a multi-
threaded, console-based application that allows you to interact with it while it continually 
checks whether or not to sound the alarm. Obviously, the Alarm Clock program does a 
bit more than its advertised function, and the goal of the exercise is to help build 
familiarity with the Windows Systinternals tool suite through attempting to figure out 
what the additional actions taken by the program are. Keep in mind that malware will not 
necessarily accomplish its goals as quickly possible, it may spread out or pace malicious 
activity in order to use fewer system resources—helping it stay under the radar of the 
user. The user interface of the Alarm Clock application is shown in Fig. 10.3. 
+ + 
I Alarm Clock VI.0 | 
(1) Display the current date and time. 
(2) Display the alarm date and time. 
(3) Set the alarm date and time. 
(4) Quit. 
>> Type an option number and press Enter: 1 
[INFO] The current time is (05/02/09 13:49:48). 
+ + 
I Alarm Clock VI.0 | 
+ + 
(1) Display the current date and time. 
(2) Display the alarm date and time. 
(3) Set the alarm date and time. 
(4) Quit. 
>> Type an option number and press Enter: 3 
>> Specify the alarm date and time...(mm/dd/yy HH:MM:SS). 
» The current date and time is (05/02/09 13:49:53). 
>> Type the alarm date and time to set ==> 05/03/09 08:00:00 
[INFO] Alarm set is successful. 
Figure 10.3. Console-based Ul for the Alarm Clock example software Trojan. 
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10.1 Malware Identification and Monitoring Exercise 
Using the Windows Sysinternals suite of diagnostic tools, identify the behaviors 
of the Alarm Clock application that make it a software Trojan. Note any filesystem, 
memory, registry, or other activity that is unrelated to the program's advertised 
functionality. The Alarm Clock application is available at the following location: 
> Alarm Clock Java Application Windows® installer: 
http://reversingproject.info/repository. php?fileID=10_l_l 
Note that even though the Alarm Clock application is written in Java, the bytecode has 
been aggressively obfuscated to discourage the use of decompilation as a strategy for 
learning the application's behavior. 
10.2 Malware Identification and Monitoring Exercise Solution 
The Alarm Clock application is a benign software Trojan that in addition to being 
a rudimentary alarm clock, collects information about the Windows® installation, and 
randomly scans for computers on the Internet or Intranet that will respond to an ICMP 
ping. The application logs all of the information it gathers into several files in a directory 
off of the root filesystem, or off of the current directory (if the root filesystem is not 
writeable). The specific information gathered by the application is as follows: 
> Registry data on the Windows® installation including the license key. 
> Registry data on the currently installed programs. 
> The locations of Microsoft Office, OpenOffice, PDF, and text documents in the 
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"Documents and Settings" folder. 
> IP addresses of random Internet/Intranet hosts that respond to an ICMP ping. 
Conclusion 
Unless something is done to include a required amount of reverse engineering 
instruction in computer science and software engineering programs of study, new 
engineers will remain ill-equipped to work with legacy software systems as well as be 
unable to ensure that software is secure and safe to deploy. Most large companies have 
existing software systems that have been the underpinning of their business for years. It's 
highly difficult, not to mention cost-prohibitive, to rip and replace mission-critical 
software systems in response to the emergence of a new technology. As a result, 
organizations are always looking for candidates that can help them understand what they 
have and how it can be evolved to interact with the latest technologies. Students and 
practicing engineers need reverse engineering skills to be able to help organizations, both 
large and small, understand their current technology stack and recommend an integration 
strategy for new technologies. Software security issues, such as how the latest virus or 
worm infects computer systems, also require extensive reverse engineering knowledge. 
Since students and engineers need to learn reverse engineering, instructors need to 
be able to teach it to them. At the present time, even experienced computer science and 
software engineering instructors may not have enough knowledge of reverse engineering 
to teach a course on it. Compounding the problem is the fact that materials for teaching a 
course on reverse engineering may be difficult to find in a format that is compatible with 
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classroom delivery. Several books exist on reverse engineering that cater to industry 
professionals or those interested in self-study. However, in a university setting, 
instructors engage students in ordered learning through exercises, quizzes, and exams. 
Since SRE is not a standard part of the computer science curriculum, instructors will be 
mostly on their own to create a course that they feel gives an adequate education on the 
subject. Since the uses of software reverse engineering have been well documented in 
the literature, it is certainly feasible to provide education on the topic, though coming up 
with good exericses is challenging. The importance of making this education available 
was emphasized by El-Ramly at the 28th International Conference on Software 
Engineering when he stated "Reengineering skills are survival skills for those who have 
to carry out software renovation and modernization projects" [48]. 
The integration of reverse engineering techniques as part of learning in traditional 
computer science courses has been tried at the University of Missouri-Rolla [3]. When 
students were polled, 77% indicated that applying reverse engineering techniques to their 
normal programming assignments reinforced concepts taught during lectures [3]. 
Furthermore, 82% of students wanted reverse engineering to be blended in future courses, 
especially those that dealt with design [3]. Given these promising trials, universities 
should continue to work toward establishing standard content for software reverse 
engineering and software maintenance courses. 
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